Retrospective LLM-Based Complexity Evaluations

EIP complexity assessment

EIP-8282: Builder Execution Requests

Assessed in Amsterdam / Glamsterdam. The score describes the EIP text available at the assessment cutoff, not the EIP as it stands today.

RetrospectiveAmsterdam / GlamsterdamAssessment cutoff 2026-07-13Added after cutoffLayers: execution, consensus
LLM Completescore 32
Human Not available· The STEEL team did not publish a human checklist for this EIP in the Amsterdam assessment round.

LLM assessment

Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2026-07-08 · 554d3325e3

Scope at the cutoff. At the recorded cutoff, EIP-8282 proposed two stateful predeploys that accept builder deposits and exits, queue them under demand-responsive fees, and expose bounded batches through end-of-block system calls as two EIP-7685 request types. The consensus layer would register or top up builders from deposit records, authorize exits through a builder's execution address, and replace EIP-7732's post-fork validator-deposit and voluntary-exit routing while retaining one-time fork-transition onboarding. The draft specified the normative queue and lifecycle behavior in detail, but its request-type allocation, signing-domain constant, runtime bytecode, deployment artifacts, reference implementation, and tests were not yet final.

32HighHigh
Evaluator
LLMChecklist v2
Confidence
Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff
Yes — 6 criteria affected
Plausible range
30–34 (High)
Assessment cutoff
2026-07-13 · EIP revision 554d3325e3 (2026-07-08)
Score bands · Checklist revision 2
  • Low <12
  • Medium 12–22
  • High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

  1. Cross-EIP interactions4
  2. Added system contracts3
  3. Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)3
  4. New fork activation mechanism3

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: Material under-specification remains in the request-type allocation, the numeric builder-deposit signing domain, and the exact predeploy runtime code and presigned deployment artifacts. The generic queue description also relies on obvious per-contract substitution of MAX_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK and TARGET_REQUESTS_PER_BLOCK, while the reference implementation and tests are absent. These gaps prevent exact cross-client vectors and activation artifacts from being finalized even though the high-level mechanics are clear.

Plausible total

30–34
recorded score 32 · plausible tiers High

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (4)
  • Which unique EIP-7685 request-type bytes will be assigned after resolving the 0x03 collision with EIP-7804?
  • What numeric value and exact consensus constant definition will DOMAIN_BUILDER_DEPOSIT use?
  • What audited runtime bytecode, resulting predeploy addresses, and presigned deployment transactions will be frozen?
  • Will final test infrastructure need only extensions of existing request-predeploy helpers, or new reusable expectation primitives?
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (3)
  • EVM gas accounting is scored 1 because two new calls use the existing gas-exempt system-call mechanism; a stricter reading limited to opcode and ordinary transaction accounting could score it 0.
  • Modified system contracts is scored 2 because consensus interpretation of validator-deposit-contract outputs changes substantially even though the deployed contract's code and state transition are unchanged.
  • The generic EIP-7685 request transport is treated as sufficient for transition-tool and Engine API interfaces; the sealed package contains no separate transition-tool schema for confirmation.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-8282 Amsterdam / Glamsterdam: LLM criterion scores and rationale
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Cross-EIP interactionsUnder-specifiedExceptional4Seven identified EIPs interact: 1559, 6110, 7002, 7251, 7685, 7732, and 7804. Strong dependencies and direct EIP-7732 modification establish base score 3; four interactions beyond the first three contain one complete additional group of three, adding 1 under the uncapped formula for score 4.

Exceptional score: This is not an exceptional override of a capped anchor. Cross-EIP interactions is uncapped, and the rubric's mechanical formula yields 3 + 1 = 4 for seven interacting EIPs.

  • eip.md · Front matter and Abstract, lines 1-21 The EIP formally requires EIPs 1559, 7685, and 7732 and models its two predeploy queues on EIPs 7002 and 7251.
  • eip.md · Specification — Constants, line 41 Its proposed 0x03 request type conflicts with draft EIP-7804 and requires coordinated allocation.
  • eip.md · Specification — Consensus layer request objects and Changes to EIP-7732, lines 132 and 142-148 The deposit object derives from EIP-6110, and EIP-7732's deposit and exit processing is directly rerouted to the new request types.
Confidence: High
Interacting EIPs: EIP-1559, EIP-6110, EIP-7002, EIP-7251, EIP-7685, EIP-7732, EIP-7804
Added system contractsUnder-specified3Multiple new system contracts are introduced, and both are stateful and trigger cross-layer request actions, directly matching score 3.
  • eip.md · Abstract, lines 14-21 Two predeploy contracts accept builder deposits and exits, retain in-state queues, and emit records for consensus-layer processing.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request queue and system call, lines 67-78 Both contracts maintain persistent queue and fee state and are invoked as mandatory end-of-block system actions that create EIP-7685 requests.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: Exact runtime code and final addresses are not frozen, but the count, statefulness, and system actions are unambiguous.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)3The proposal introduces new SSZ-encoded interface records and a consensus-critical endian transformation, which is an interface-level encoding change and therefore score 3 under the binary anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification — Deposit requests, lines 92-108 A 184-byte execution input is transformed into a fixed-width request record, including conversion of the amount from big-endian calldata to little-endian SSZ encoding.
  • eip.md · Specification — Consensus layer request objects, lines 116-132 Two new SSZ containers and fixed-size concatenated request_data encodings of 184 and 68 bytes are defined for the execution-to-consensus interface.
Confidence: High
New fork activation mechanismUnder-specified3Activation requires more than initialization of a new client variable: the first active block performs a consensus-mandated modification of pre-existing deployed contract state. This meets the score-3 activation anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification — Deployment, lines 61-65 Both contracts must be deployed before activation with excess set to an inhibitor, and every active block is invalid if either address lacks code.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request fee, line 90 The first active end-of-block call changes predeployed contract state by clearing the inhibitor and enabling normal request fees.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: Final bytecode, addresses, and presigned deployment transactions were not frozen, but the activation-state transition itself is explicit.
Security risks3The mechanisms cross execution contract state, request commitments, BLS registration, builder balances, cold-key authorization, and EIP-7732 withdrawals. They alter assumptions across multiple critical components and warrant extensive security review and fuzzing, matching score 3.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations, lines 172-182 The proposal identifies deposit-signature domains and replay, sole-address exit authorization, a custodial exit standoff, reusable indices, queue spam and state growth, locked funds, and privileged system-read access as security-sensitive behavior.
  • eip.md · Specification — Consensus-layer processing of records, lines 136-140 Request handling mutates builder registration, balances, exit timing, and withdrawals, with several invalid records silently consumed rather than invalidating the block.
Confidence: High
Performance risks3Performance spans execution storage growth and system calls, consensus BLS verification, cross-block FIFO backlog, and an unbounded activation-time scan. These interactions cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation and can substantially affect fork-transition and steady-state behavior, meeting score 3.
  • eip.md · Rationale — Onboarding via the fork transition, line 160 One-time onboarding processes the entire pending-deposits queue and verifies a proof-of-possession for each new builder; its cost is not constant-bounded and clients are advised to pre-verify and cache results.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — Spam and state growth, lines 174 and 179-182 Steady-state processing adds bounded consensus BLS checks and request data, but enqueue is only gas-limited, queue state can grow across blocks, and a FIFO backlog can throttle onboarding.
Confidence: High
Edge/boundary conditions3Multiple boundary-prone mechanisms interact across value arithmetic, byte encodings, queue caps and resets, fork timing, builder lifecycle states, and authorization. Several require an elevated combinatorial case set, meeting score 3.
  • eip.md · Specification — Deposit and exit requests, lines 92-115 Deposit processing has exact calldata, amount, fee, funding, overpayment, and endian boundaries, while exits have exact calldata, caller authorization, and fee conditions.
  • eip.md · Specification — Consensus-layer processing of records, lines 134-140 Outcomes branch on first registration versus top-up, exited versus swept entries, finality and activity, authorization, pending balances, and silent discard behavior.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — Spam and state growth, lines 179-182 Queue draining is capped while enqueue and cross-block backlog growth are not, FIFO ordering can delay honest registrations, and rejected or overpaid records lock funds.
Confidence: High
Modified system contracts2There is no direct code or state modification, but the validator deposit contract's post-fork output loses a major builder-routing role. That is a major indirect behavioral effect on one existing protocol contract, matching score 2.
  • eip.md · Specification — Changes to EIP-7732, lines 142-148 The deployed validator deposit contract is not changed, but after the fork its requests always follow validator processing and can no longer onboard or top up builders except through the retained one-time transition snapshot.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 162-166 Existing validator deposit, withdrawal, and consolidation contract code remains untouched while builder lifecycle routing changes on the consensus layer.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The classification depends on treating changed consensus interpretation of an unchanged deposit contract's requests as an indirect system-contract effect.
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests2A considerable subset of existing EIP-7732 builder-lifecycle and fork-transition tests must be reworked for new request sources and handlers, but the affected population is concentrated in builder onboarding, top-ups, and exits rather than diverse execution behavior.
  • eip.md · Specification — Changes to EIP-7732, lines 142-148 Existing Gloas builder branches are removed from deposit-request and voluntary-exit processing, post-fork builder routing moves to two new request handlers, and the one-time onboarding path remains.
Confidence: High
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensusUnder-specified2Clients must coordinate exact request-type allocation, the signing-domain constant, and deployable bytecode and artifacts before common vectors can be baselined. The gaps are material but localized to constants and deployment artifacts rather than newly observable formerly-unspecified behavior, matching score 2.
  • eip.md · Specification — Constants, lines 39-59 The proposed request bytes are not final because 0x03 conflicts with draft EIP-7804, final allocation is deferred to consensus-specs, and runtime code is delegated to the missing reference implementation.
  • eip.md · Specification — Deployment, lines 61-63 Predeploy addresses depend on presigned transactions for runtime bytecode that may still change before audit and freezing.
  • eip.md · Reference Implementation, lines 168-170 Both test cases and the reference implementation are TODO.
  • eip.md · Specification — Consensus-layer processing and Security Considerations, lines 138 and 174-175 A new consensus-critical DOMAIN_BUILDER_DEPOSIT is required, but the EIP gives no numeric domain constant.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: Independent clients could implement much of the normative behavior from the prose, but exact cross-client byte-for-byte fixtures cannot be finalized from this revision alone.
EVM Gas rule changes1The proposal extends the existing exceptional system-call gas-accounting path to two additional calls, fitting an update to an existing mechanism. It does not alter opcode costs or ordinary transaction gas accounting.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request queue and system call, lines 76-78 Each new predeploy is invoked with a dedicated 30,000,000 gas allowance whose consumption is excluded from the block gas limit, and a failed call invalidates the block.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The rubric boundary is whether adding calls to an already-defined gas-exempt system-call mechanism counts as updating EVM gas accounting; this assessment treats it as score 1 rather than 0.
New invariant on pre-existing tests1Pre-existing activation and request-bus tests gain assertions for code presence, mandatory calls, and first-call state. This is a narrow fork-related category, not every test, because empty new request data is excluded from the existing requests hash.
  • eip.md · Specification — Deployment and Request queue, lines 61-78 Post-activation blocks require code at both predeploy addresses and must execute both end-of-block system calls, whose failures invalidate the block.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request fee, line 90 The first system call changes each predeploy's excess value from the inhibitor to normal fee state.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: Whether generic post-fork fixtures expose system-call outputs mechanically could broaden the affected test category, but the EIP's empty-request rule avoids a universal new requests-hash assertion.
New test-framework primitivesUnder-specified1Existing system-call and request-bus primitives should remain usable, but minor extensions are needed to construct and inspect the two builder request forms and their predeploy states.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request queue and system call, lines 67-78 The two contracts reuse the established EIP-7002/EIP-7251 queue and system-call pattern while defining new fixed-size records and request types.
  • eip.md · Reference Implementation, lines 168-170 Test cases and a reference implementation remain TODO at the cutoff.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The absent test cases and reference implementation leave the exact helper surface unspecified; a reusable new expectation primitive could raise this to 2.
CryptographyUnder-specified1One well-known BLS proof-of-possession mechanism is introduced in a new domain, matching score 1 rather than novel cryptography.
  • eip.md · Specification — Consensus-layer processing of records, lines 136-140 First builder registration verifies a BLS proof-of-possession over a DepositMessage under a new builder-specific signing domain; top-ups ignore the signature.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — Cross-class deposit signatures, lines 174-175 Domain separation prevents replay between validator and builder deposit classes while retaining the established BLS deposit-signature mechanism.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: The numerical DOMAIN_BUILDER_DEPOSIT value is absent, but the cryptographic mechanism and security purpose are clear enough to select the anchor.
Show 14 zero-score criteria
Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 2)
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes0No opcode is introduced.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 162-166 The execution-layer feature is additive through two contracts at empty addresses and the existing request bus.
Modified opcodes0No existing opcode's result or non-gas behavior is modified or deprecated.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 162-166 The proposal describes additive contract deployment and explicitly leaves existing execution-layer lifecycle contracts unchanged.
Added precompiles0No precompile is introduced.
  • eip.md · Abstract, lines 14-21 The new execution components are specified as predeploy contracts with storage-backed queues, not precompiles.
Modified precompiles0No precompile logic or gas schedule is modified.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 162-166 The stated execution-layer scope is two new contracts and no change to existing lifecycle contracts.
State-access ordering within opcode execution0Contract calls and storage operations are added, but no opcode's internal state-access position or gas-charge ordering is changed.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 162-166 The execution-layer change is described as additive through contracts at previously empty addresses, with existing validator contracts left unchanged.
Blob gas accounting changes0The request fee neither meters blobs nor modifies any blob-gas mechanism.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request fee, lines 80-90 The only new demand-responsive fee is a per-request fee driven by each contract's request count and excess counter.
State gas accounting changes0Although the feature writes execution state, it introduces no state-gas cost, state-byte rate, block state-gas budget, reservoir, or execution-gas spill rule.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request queue and system call, lines 67-74 The contracts maintain ordinary storage-backed counters and FIFO records and dispatch among dequeue, write, fee-getter, and revert paths.
New EVM gas refund0The proposal introduces no EVM gas-refund mechanism; its explicit no-refund economic behavior is unrelated to EVM gas refunds.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — Locked funds, line 181 Request fees, overpayments, remainders, and rejected first-deposit principal are permanently locked, and the predeploys have no withdrawal path.
New transaction types0New execution request types are not new transaction envelope types.
  • eip.md · Specification — Deposit and exit requests, lines 92-115 Users submit both request forms by ordinary calls to the two contracts with exact calldata and value conditions.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms0Contract-level request acceptance and block-level system-call validity do not modify the validity rules or intrinsic gas of existing transaction types.
  • eip.md · Specification — Deposit and exit requests, lines 92-115 Amount, fee, funding, and caller checks occur inside the called contracts; rejected inputs revert at contract execution.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 162-166 The execution-layer change is additive and does not state any change to transaction envelopes, intrinsic gas, or transaction validity.
New block / header fields0EIP-8282 populates an existing extensible commitment and introduces no block or header field.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request queue and system call, line 76 The new request records are committed through the existing EIP-7685 requests_hash field.
  • supporting/eip-7685.md · Specification — Block Header, lines 45-70 EIP-7685 already defines requests_hash as the execution-header field for arbitrary request types.
Block syncing changes0EIP-8282 adds request contents and validation but no block-RLP validation mechanism requiring client-sync tests.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 162-166 The execution-layer addition uses existing contracts-and-requests machinery and introduces no new block field.
  • supporting/eip-7685.md · Specification — Block Header, lines 45-70 The requests_hash header commitment and its computation are already defined by EIP-7685.
Engine API changes0No Engine API field, endpoint, or communication mechanism is added by the sealed proposal.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request queue and system call, line 76 Builder records are carried through the existing EIP-7685 requests list and requests_hash commitment.
  • supporting/eip-7732.md · Specification — Engine API, lines 369-371 The underlying Gloas proposal explicitly states that no Engine API changes are needed.
Uncertainty: EIP-8282 has no dedicated Engine API section, but its explicit reuse of EIP-7685 and the packaged EIP-7732 statement support score 0.
Transition-tool interface changes0The sealed specification requires new values within the existing generic requests mechanism but specifies no new transition-tool field or interface mechanism.
  • supporting/eip-7685.md · Specification — Requests, lines 34-43 The existing request bus represents every type through one generic request-type byte plus opaque request data.
  • eip.md · Specification — Request queue and system call, lines 76-78 The new outputs are inserted into the existing EIP-7685 block requests list.
Uncertainty: The package does not include a transition-tool schema, so this score relies on the sealed EIP-7685 generic request representation being sufficient without new interface fields.
Assessment provenance
Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@554d3325e3 EIPS/eip-8282.md committed 2026-07-08 · information cutoff 2026-07-13T07:12:57Z
Current master · File history · blob 35ab20cb31 · sha256 ff36162c244b
Rubric
Checklist revision 2 · ethspecs/pm@3d8c0128c5
Evaluator
gpt-5.6-sol at xhigh reasoning effort · isolation bubblewrap_one_eip_capsule_v1
Source record
Frozen research record research/tasks/05-retrospective-complexity-assignment/outputs/fork-eips/amsterdam/eip-8282.yaml · sha256 068d43f25d0f
Supporting documents in the sealed package
supporting/eip-1559.md, supporting/eip-6110.md, supporting/eip-7002.md, supporting/eip-7251.md, supporting/eip-7685.md, supporting/eip-7732.md, supporting/eip-7804.md
Compare EIP-8282 with other assessmentsAll Amsterdam / Glamsterdam assessments
Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

  • Added opcodes
    Introduces new opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No new opcodes are introduced.
    1
    A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
  • Modified opcodes
    Modifies pre-existing opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
    3
    At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
  • Added precompiles
    Introduces new precompiles
    Score anchors
    0
    No new precompiles are introduced.
    1
    A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
  • Modified precompiles
    Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
    1
    At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
    2
    Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
    3
    The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
  • Added system contracts
    Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
    Score anchors
    0
    No new system contracts are introduced.
    1
    A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    2
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    3
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
  • Modified system contracts
    Modifies pre-existing system contracts
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
    1
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    2
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    3
    At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

  • EVM Gas rule changes
    New EVM gas accounting rules
    Score anchors
    0
    No gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State-access ordering within opcode execution · Checklist revision 2 only
    Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
    Score anchors
    0
    No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
    1
    A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
    2
    Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
    3
    The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
    • Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
    • Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
    • Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
  • Blob gas accounting changes
    New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No blob gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State gas accounting changes · Checklist revision 2 only
    New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
    Score anchors
    0
    No state gas accounting changes.
    1
    An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
    2
    A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
    3
    A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
    • Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
  • New EVM gas refund
    New gas-refund mechanism
    Score anchors
    0
    No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    2
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    3
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

  • New transaction types
    Introduces a new transaction type
    Score anchors
    0
    No new transaction types are introduced.
    3
    A new transaction type is introduced.
  • New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
    Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
    Score anchors
    0
    No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
    1
    Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
    2
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
    3
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
  • New block / header fields
    Introduces new block or block header fields
    Score anchors
    0
    No new block or header fields are introduced.
    3
    A new block or header field is introduced.
  • Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
    Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
    Score anchors
    0
    No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
    3
    An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
    • "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
  • Block syncing changes
    Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    1
    A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
    3
    Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
  • New fork activation mechanism
    Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
    Score anchors
    0
    No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
    3
    Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
    • Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

  • Engine API changes
    Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
    Score anchors
    0
    No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
    1
    A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
    2
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
    3
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
  • Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
    Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
  • Transition-tool interface changes
    Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
    1
    A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    2
    Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    3
    Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    • Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

  • Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
    Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
    1
    Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
    2
    Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
    3
    Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
  • New invariant on pre-existing tests · Checklist revision 2 only
    Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
    Score anchors
    0
    Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
    1
    A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
    2
    A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
    3
    Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
    • Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
  • New test-framework primitives · Checklist revision 2 only
    Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
    Score anchors
    0
    Existing test primitives suffice.
    1
    Existing primitives need minor extension.
    2
    New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
    3
    New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

  • Security risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
  • Performance risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
  • Edge/boundary conditions
    Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
    Score anchors
    0
    No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
    1
    A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
    3
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
  • Cryptography
    Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
    Score anchors
    0
    No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
    2
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
    3
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

  • Cross-EIP interactions
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
    Score anchors
    0
    Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
    1
    The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
    2
    The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
    3
    The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
    • +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
    • This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
  • Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · Checklist revision 2 only
    The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
    Score anchors
    0
    The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
    1
    A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
    2
    Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
    3
    A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
    • Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.