Retrospective LLM-Based Complexity Evaluations

EIP complexity assessment

EIP-8237: Independent CL/EL Sync

Assessed in Hegotá. The score describes the EIP text available at the snapshot, not the EIP as it stands today.

ProspectiveHegotáSnapshot 2026-08-25PFI at snapshotLayers: execution, consensus
LLM Completescore 29
Human Pending· No STEEL checklist existed on the ethspecs/pm default branch or in any open pull request at the snapshot.

LLM assessment

Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2026-08-25 · ac450a4ab2 · Inclusion status at snapshot: PFI

Scope at the cutoff. Execution-layer-only assessment of draft EIP-8237 at the sealed Hegota PFI snapshot. The scored surface adds a consensus-critical partial_header_hash to ExecutionPayload and the execution block header, requires independent EL computation and validation of that value, and requires a new Engine API lookup method; consensus-layer range-sync behavior is treated only as boundary context.

29HighHigh
Evaluator
LLMChecklist v2
Confidence
Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff
Yes — 7 criteria affected
Plausible range
25–31 (High)
Snapshot
2026-08-25 · EIP revision ac450a4ab2 (2026-08-25)
Score bands · Checklist revision 2
  • Low <12
  • Medium 12–22
  • High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

  1. New block / header fields3
  2. Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)3
  3. Patterns affecting pre-existing tests3
  4. Security risks3

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: Material details are absent for the consensus-critical raw serialization of composite withdrawal/request data, the execution-header field ordering and fork-aware encoding, and the new Engine API method's concrete protocol and historical lookup semantics. These are recorded chiefly under the unspecified-behavior anchor rather than multiplied across unrelated rows.

Plausible total

25–31
recorded score 29 · plausible tiers High

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (4)
  • What is the complete, unambiguous byte encoding and framing for withdrawals and each ExecutionRequests component in the SHA256 preimage?
  • Where exactly is partial_header_hash placed in the execution header encoding, and how is the parent-to-activation-block boundary handled?
  • What are the new Engine API method's name, version, request/response types, error semantics, and historical data-availability requirements?
  • Is divergence localization a caller-driven sequence of per-block lookups, and what history must an EL retain to support it?
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (3)
  • The function is described as an accumulator that chains across blocks, while its explicit inputs contain parent_hash rather than a separately named prior accumulator; the intended indirect chain depends on parent_hash covering the prior header field.
  • "Raw bytes serialization" is precise for uint64 but incomplete for the composite list contents and does not state explicit framing or domain separation.
  • The required Engine API method is described only by purpose, not as a testable wire contract.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-8237 Hegotá: LLM criterion scores and rationale
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
New block / header fields3The rubric assigns 3 whenever a new block or header field is introduced.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > Header The EIP explicitly adds partial_header_hash to the execution layer block header and states that block_hash covers it.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: Field placement is under-specified, but introduction of the field is explicit.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)Under-specified3A new field changes the encoded execution block header and payload/interface shape, satisfying the rubric's binary encoding-change anchor.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers partial_header_hash is added to both ExecutionPayload and the execution block Header and is covered by block_hash.
  • eip.md · Accumulator Definition Consensus-critical raw byte serialization is prescribed for uint64 values and list elements in the SHA256 preimage.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: Exact field placement and complete raw serialization of composite list entries are not fully specified, but an encoding change is unambiguous.
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests3This is a new validation rule on every post-activation execution block. Existing payload/header construction, block-hash, valid-block, invalid-block, and sync patterns must be reworked to populate the field and satisfy or intentionally violate the commitment, making the affected test surface broad rather than a contrived subset.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers Every post-activation ExecutionPayload and execution header gains partial_header_hash, which is covered by block_hash.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification EL block validation must independently recompute the new commitment and reject a mismatch.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: The package does not enumerate test suites, but the mandatory field and validation apply uniformly to post-activation execution blocks.
Security risksUnder-specified3Incorrect encoding, accumulation, request derivation, or validation can split EL block validity and undermine deferred inconsistency detection. The mechanism touches multiple critical components—header hashing, block validation, withdrawals, execution requests, and Engine API coordination—requiring broad security review and adversarial testing even though the EIP claims no new trust assumption.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > Header The new commitment becomes part of the execution block hash.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification EL consensus validity depends on independently recomputing and matching the commitment across header fields, withdrawals, slot number, and execution requests.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations The commitment is the cryptographic guarantee intended to detect inconsistency after deferred cross-layer verification.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: The consensus-layer sync process itself is outside the scored surface; the score reflects only failure modes of the EL commitment and its cross-layer boundary.
Edge/boundary conditionsUnder-specified3Tests must cover empty and populated variable lists, serialization boundaries, correct and incorrect field components, parent-linked accumulator continuity, and divergence at different positions in a synced range. The variable-list and chain-position dimensions create an elevated case count.
  • eip.md · Accumulator Definition The hash preimage combines fixed-width values with variable lists of withdrawals and execution requests using raw concatenated serialization.
  • eip.md · Execution Engine API After long range sync, divergence can occur at an unknown block and the new per-block lookup is intended to locate it.
  • eip.md · Rationale > Accumulator Pattern The commitment chains across sequential blocks and permits deferred verification of an entire range.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: Exact list serialization and divergence-search behavior are under-specified, increasing uncertainty about the final boundary matrix but not eliminating it.
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensusUnder-specified3The exact bytes feeding a newly observable consensus-critical hash are not fully determined for constructible composite-list cases. Clients must agree on those bytes and revise baselines when the draft is completed; the missing API and header details add localized coordination needs but are not scored again as separate unspecified mechanisms.
  • eip.md · Accumulator Definition The new consensus-critical hash uses "raw bytes serialization" and concatenation, but composite execution-request encoding and complete domain/framing rules are not defined.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > Header A header field is required without a concrete field-order or fork-aware encoding rule.
  • eip.md · Execution Engine API A new method is required without a method name, version, schemas, error cases, or historical-availability semantics.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: No implementation, devnet, discussion, or amendment evidence is available or permitted; the score is based solely on the draft text's unresolved consensus-visible encoding.
Block syncing changesUnder-specified2The new header member and its consensus-critical multi-input validation form a single complex block-validation change that execution-client sync tests must exercise.
  • eip.md · Motivation Independent CL/EL range sync and deferred cross-layer verification are the proposal's stated synchronization purpose.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > Header The execution block header gains partial_header_hash and block_hash covers it.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification Synced execution blocks must pass a multi-field accumulator validation.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The EIP does not explicitly spell out the header's RLP position or sync importer behavior, so complexity between simple and complex validation remains plausible.
Engine API changesUnder-specified2A new Engine API endpoint is explicitly required, meeting score 2; the package specifies only one new payload field, so the score-3 combination of multiple fields plus a new endpoint is not established.
  • eip.md · Execution Engine API The Execution Engine requires a new method that returns the accumulator for a supplied block_hash.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > ExecutionPayload ExecutionPayload gains the partial_header_hash field.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: The new method's name, request/response schema, versioning, error behavior, and historical-availability requirements are unspecified.
New invariant on pre-existing tests2Tests unrelated to EIP-8237 but constructing a post-activation execution block gain the same mechanically applied commitment invariant. The evidence does not require re-deriving pre-fork vectors, so the score remains below 3.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification Each EL-validated block must satisfy block.partial_header_hash == expected over the specified block and request fields.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: Whether individual harnesses expose this as an explicit assertion or implicit block-validity check is not specified.
Cross-EIP interactions2EIP-8237 depends on and modifies the EIP-7732 payload-separation commitment and directly consumes the EIP-7843 slot_number in the new EL commitment; these require coordinated testing but remain limited to the commitment and payload/header boundary.
  • eip.md · Front matter > requires EIP-8237 explicitly requires EIP-7732.
  • eip.md · Abstract It replaces the EIP-7732 ExecutionPayloadBid execution_requests_root design and adds the cross-layer commitment to the payload.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > ExecutionPayload The new hash is added alongside EIP-7843 slot_number, which is also an explicit input to compute_partial_header_hash.
  • supporting/eip-7732.md · Specification > Execution Layer EIP-7732 itself specified no EL changes, so EIP-8237 supplies a new EL surface tied to its payload separation design.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: The package names no originating EIP for withdrawals or the ExecutionRequests type, so those package-grounded mechanism interactions are not assigned invented EIP numbers.
Interacting EIPs: EIP-7732, EIP-7843
Transition-tool interface changes1A transition tool processing the fork's payload shape needs one new input/output field.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > ExecutionPayload A single new partial_header_hash field is added to ExecutionPayload.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The package does not define a transition-tool schema separately from ExecutionPayload.
Performance risksUnder-specified1The per-block hash calculation and keyed lookup are new performance-sensitive operations, but their core costs can be benchmarked in isolation and the package does not establish substantial impact on existing EL benchmarks.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification EL validation adds one SHA256 computation over several fixed fields and the withdrawals and execution-requests lists for each block.
  • eip.md · Execution Engine API The engine must support accumulator retrieval by block hash during divergence diagnosis after long range sync.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: Historical retention and repeated lookup/search behavior are unspecified; a less isolated storage design could raise the score to 2.
Cryptography1One well-known cryptographic hash mechanism is newly used for the consensus-critical accumulator.
  • eip.md · Rationale > SHA256 Instead of Hash Tree Root The new commitment explicitly uses plain SHA256, selected as a primitive both layers already have.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: No novel cryptographic primitive or construction beyond the specified SHA256 commitment is evidenced.
Show 15 zero-score criteria
Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 2)
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes0No opcode is added.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer The EL specification introduces no EVM instruction.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
Modified opcodes0No pre-existing opcode is modified.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer The block-level accumulator changes do not alter or deprecate any existing opcode behavior.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
Added precompiles0No precompile is introduced.
  • eip.md · Rationale > SHA256 Instead of Hash Tree Root SHA256 is used by client validation as an existing primitive; the EIP does not add an EVM precompile.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
Modified precompiles0No pre-existing precompile is modified.
  • eip.md · Rationale > SHA256 Instead of Hash Tree Root The proposal selects SHA256 for client-side commitment calculation and specifies no precompile logic or gas-schedule modification.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
Added system contracts0No new system contract exists in the sealed proposal.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer The EL changes consist of container/header fields, accumulator validation, and an Engine API method; no system contract is introduced.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
Modified system contracts0The proposal has no specified system-contract interaction.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer No pre-existing system contract code, state, call, or indirect behavior is modified by the specified EL mechanism.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
EVM Gas rule changes0The proposal changes block-level commitment validation, not EVM gas accounting.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification The EL rule introduced is equality validation of partial_header_hash; no EVM gas rule is added or changed.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
State-access ordering within opcode execution0No opcode state access or gas-charge ordering is modified.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification Verification computes a block-level hash from header, withdrawals, slot, and request data and does not alter opcode execution.
Uncertainty: No opcode-level behavior is specified by this EIP.
Blob gas accounting changes0The proposal introduces no blob gas accounting rule.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > ExecutionPayload Existing blob_gas_used and excess_blob_gas fields are shown unchanged while only partial_header_hash is added.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
State gas accounting changes0No state-writing gas mechanism is introduced or modified.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification The new operation is block commitment hashing and comparison, with no state-gas cost, budget, reservoir, or spill rule.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
New EVM gas refund0There is no new EVM gas-refund mechanism.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer The complete EL specification adds payload/header commitment fields, validation, and an API lookup, but no refund behavior.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
New transaction types0The proposal adds no transaction type.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Modified Containers > ExecutionPayload The existing transactions list is shown unchanged; the added value is a payload/header field.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms0Existing transaction validity rules and intrinsic-gas calculation are unchanged.
  • eip.md · Execution Layer > Execution Layer Verification The new validity assertion applies to the block's partial_header_hash, not to transaction validity or intrinsic gas.
Uncertainty: No material uncertainty in the sealed execution-layer text.
New fork activation mechanism0Requiring a hard fork is not itself the special activation mechanism scored by this row.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility The container changes require hard-fork activation, but no activation-block state mutation or pre-existing internal-variable modification is specified.
Uncertainty: The EIP gives no activation procedure; no scored mutation may be inferred from that absence.
New test-framework primitives0The sealed proposal establishes test cases and data generation needs, but does not require a new framework-level primitive beyond ordinary hash calculation and equality checks.
  • eip.md · Accumulator Definition The proposal defines the expected value using SHA256, concatenation, and raw serialization without requiring a novel expectation or modifier abstraction.
Uncertainty: No test-framework design is included in the package; absent such evidence, no framework primitive is scored.
Assessment provenance
Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@ac450a4ab2 EIPS/eip-8237.md committed 2026-08-25 · information cutoff 2026-08-25T11:56:58Z
Current master · File history · blob c0dc69ed3d · sha256 192437824e82
Rubric
Checklist revision 2 · ethspecs/pm@3d8c0128c5
Evaluator
gpt-5.6-sol at xhigh reasoning effort · isolation bubblewrap_one_eip_capsule_v1
Source record
Frozen research record research/tasks/08-hegota-prospective-complexity-assessment/outputs/assessments/hegota-pfi-2026-08-26/eip-8237.yaml · sha256 de10beacc3e5
Supporting documents in the sealed package
supporting/eip-7732.md
Compare EIP-8237 with other assessmentsAll Hegotá assessments
Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

  • Added opcodes
    Introduces new opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No new opcodes are introduced.
    1
    A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
  • Modified opcodes
    Modifies pre-existing opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
    3
    At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
  • Added precompiles
    Introduces new precompiles
    Score anchors
    0
    No new precompiles are introduced.
    1
    A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
  • Modified precompiles
    Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
    1
    At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
    2
    Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
    3
    The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
  • Added system contracts
    Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
    Score anchors
    0
    No new system contracts are introduced.
    1
    A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    2
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    3
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
  • Modified system contracts
    Modifies pre-existing system contracts
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
    1
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    2
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    3
    At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

  • EVM Gas rule changes
    New EVM gas accounting rules
    Score anchors
    0
    No gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State-access ordering within opcode execution · Checklist revision 2 only
    Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
    Score anchors
    0
    No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
    1
    A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
    2
    Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
    3
    The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
    • Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
    • Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
    • Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
  • Blob gas accounting changes
    New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No blob gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State gas accounting changes · Checklist revision 2 only
    New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
    Score anchors
    0
    No state gas accounting changes.
    1
    An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
    2
    A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
    3
    A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
    • Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
  • New EVM gas refund
    New gas-refund mechanism
    Score anchors
    0
    No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    2
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    3
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

  • New transaction types
    Introduces a new transaction type
    Score anchors
    0
    No new transaction types are introduced.
    3
    A new transaction type is introduced.
  • New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
    Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
    Score anchors
    0
    No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
    1
    Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
    2
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
    3
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
  • New block / header fields
    Introduces new block or block header fields
    Score anchors
    0
    No new block or header fields are introduced.
    3
    A new block or header field is introduced.
  • Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
    Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
    Score anchors
    0
    No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
    3
    An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
    • "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
  • Block syncing changes
    Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    1
    A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
    3
    Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
  • New fork activation mechanism
    Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
    Score anchors
    0
    No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
    3
    Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
    • Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

  • Engine API changes
    Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
    Score anchors
    0
    No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
    1
    A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
    2
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
    3
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
  • Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
    Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
  • Transition-tool interface changes
    Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
    1
    A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    2
    Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    3
    Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    • Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

  • Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
    Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
    1
    Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
    2
    Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
    3
    Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
  • New invariant on pre-existing tests · Checklist revision 2 only
    Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
    Score anchors
    0
    Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
    1
    A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
    2
    A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
    3
    Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
    • Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
  • New test-framework primitives · Checklist revision 2 only
    Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
    Score anchors
    0
    Existing test primitives suffice.
    1
    Existing primitives need minor extension.
    2
    New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
    3
    New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

  • Security risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
  • Performance risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
  • Edge/boundary conditions
    Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
    Score anchors
    0
    No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
    1
    A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
    3
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
  • Cryptography
    Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
    Score anchors
    0
    No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
    2
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
    3
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

  • Cross-EIP interactions
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
    Score anchors
    0
    Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
    1
    The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
    2
    The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
    3
    The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
    • +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
    • This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
  • Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · Checklist revision 2 only
    The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
    Score anchors
    0
    The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
    1
    A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
    2
    Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
    3
    A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
    • Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.