Retrospective LLM-Based Complexity Evaluations

EIP complexity assessment

EIP-7954: Increase Maximum Contract Size

Assessed in Amsterdam / Glamsterdam. The score describes the EIP text available at the assessment cutoff, not the EIP as it stands today.

RetrospectiveAmsterdam / GlamsterdamAssessment cutoff 2026-01-20Included by cutoffLayers: execution
LLM Completescore 14
Human Not available· The STEEL team did not publish a human checklist for this EIP in the Amsterdam assessment round.

LLM assessment

Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2026-01-18 · e43e899bb1

Scope at the cutoff. EIP-7954 (revision e43e899, status Stagnant) is a parameter-only change. It raises the EIP-170 limit on deployed contract code from 24KiB (0x6000) to 32KiB (0x8000) and the EIP-3860 initcode limit from 48KiB (0xC000) to 64KiB (0x10000). The rationale says only the size limits change. EIP-3860's per-word initcode metering, the existing failure modes (creation fails as if out of gas, CREATE/CREATE2 abort exceptionally, an oversized create transaction is invalid) and every other rule stay as they are. Activation is by hard fork.

14MediumMedium
Evaluator
LLMChecklist v3
Confidence
Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff
Yes — 2 criteria affected
Plausible range
12–14 (Medium)
Assessment cutoff
2026-01-20 · EIP revision e43e899bb1 (2026-01-18)
Score bands · Checklist revision 3
  • Low <12
  • Medium 12–22
  • High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

  1. Modified opcodes3
  2. Patterns affecting pre-existing tests2
  3. Security risks2
  4. Performance risks2

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: There are minor gaps and no unresolved consensus outcome. The EIP does not say that the new initcode limit (0x10000) breaks the 16-bit code-size property that EIP-3860 advertised. Its abstract mentions only the code-size increase, although the specification covers both limits.

Plausible total

12–14
recorded score 14 · plausible tiers Medium

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (2)
  • Do any EVM implementations depend on EIP-3860's 16-bit code-size and offset property, which a 65536-byte initcode now breaks?
  • Was the expected DoS exposure from 32KiB code loading and 64KiB initcode analysis benchmarked? The EIP says only that the increase is 'marginal'.
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (4)
  • Modified opcodes: it is a judgment call whether a threshold-only change to CREATE/CREATE2 exceptional-halt conditions counts as a semantic change. It is scored 3 here, but 0 is defensible.
  • Size-limit failures read as gas limits versus validity and halting thresholds (GAS scored 0, 1 possible).
  • The abstract mentions only the code-size increase, but the specification and title also raise the initcode limit.
  • At this revision the EIP's status is Stagnant; the discussions-to title refers to 48kb, while the specification says 32KiB.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-7954 Amsterdam / Glamsterdam: LLM criterion scores and rationale
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Modified opcodes3The conditions under which CREATE/CREATE2 halt exceptionally and when code deposit fails change. Initcode of 48–64KiB and runtime code of 24–32KiB used to fail and now succeed. That is an observable change to exceptional-halt and return-value semantics, which the criterion counts, so level 3.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Rules 3: "If length of initcode to CREATE or CREATE2 instructions exceeds MAX_INITCODE_SIZE, instruction execution exceptionally aborts" The exceptional-halt condition for CREATE/CREATE2 is tied to MAX_INITCODE_SIZE.
  • supporting/eip-170.md · Specification: "contract creation fails with an out of gas error" Whether creation succeeds depends on MAX_CODE_SIZE.
  • eip.md · Specification Both thresholds change.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: This is a threshold-only change. A reader who treats parameter changes as leaving 'specified semantics' unchanged would score 0.
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests2Boundary cases in several families must be reworked: the code-deposit size limit (CREATE, CREATE2 and create transactions), the initcode abort in CREATE/CREATE2, and initcode validity for create transactions, including the expected metering gas. For example, 49153-byte initcode that used to fail must now succeed. The rework is limited to boundary cases rather than being a common rewrite, so it is localized cases in several families: level 2.
  • supporting/eip-170.md · Specification: "more than MAX_CODE_SIZE bytes, contract creation fails" Baseline tests use 24576/24577 as the code-deposit boundary.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Test Cases: "len(initcode) at MAX_INITCODE_SIZE+1" Baseline tests use 49152/49153 as the initcode boundary for CREATE, CREATE2 and create transactions.
  • eip.md · Specification items 1-2 Both boundaries move.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: If code-size and initcode-size tests are treated as a single family, level 1 would apply.
Security risksUnder-specified2Moving the initcode limit to 0x10000 breaks the 16-bit code-size property that EIP-3860 advertised to EVM engines. Interpreter and analysis components that used 16-bit sizes need targeted review and fuzzing at sizes 65535 and 65536 (overflow and truncation). The DoS bounds for code loading also change. This is a bounded interaction that changes another component's assumptions, so level 2.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Abstract: "the size limit results in the nice-to-have property that EVM code size, code offset (PC), and jump offset fits a 16-bit value" EVM engines may depend on code size fitting in 16 bits.
  • eip.md · Specification item 2: "64KiB (0x10000 bytes)" The new initcode limit, 65536, does not fit in an unsigned 16-bit value.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations Only DoS is discussed; the 16-bit property is not mentioned.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: Whether any engine actually relies on the 16-bit property is not established in the supplied documents.
Performance risksUnder-specified2The resource bounds grow by 33% for code loading and analysis per cold call and for jumpdest analysis and hashing of initcode. Worst-case blocks of calls to many maximum-size contracts (disk/state reads plus code analysis), and blocks that create from maximum-size initcode, need targeted integrated benchmarking under the new bounds. This is a bounded interaction with no new resource coupling, so level 2.
  • supporting/eip-170.md · Rationale: "the call can trigger O(n) cost in terms of reading the code from disk, preprocessing the code" The code size limit bounds work done per call that gas does not price.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Rationale / Reason for size limit of initcode The initcode pricing was chosen with a bounded worst case in mind; the bound now grows.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations: "may marginally increase the risk of denial-of-service" The target acknowledges more DoS exposure.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: Component benchmarks of code loading and analysis alone might be judged enough, which would give level 1.
Edge/boundary conditions2Two boundary-sensitive mechanisms change: the code-deposit size limit (32768 vs 32769) and the initcode size limit (65536 vs 65537), the latter at both the transaction and opcode sites. Each can be tested on its own dimension with no interacting matrix, so level 2.
  • eip.md · Specification items 1 and 2 Two independent limits change: the code-deposit limit to 0x8000 and the initcode limit to 0x10000.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Rules 1 and 3 The initcode limit applies at transaction validity and at CREATE/CREATE2 execution.
Confidence: High
Cross-EIP interactions2Coordinated cases are needed in which a single creation exercises both changed limits, for example 64KiB initcode deploying 32KiB runtime code through a create transaction, CREATE and CREATE2. These cases also check EIP-3860 initcode metering and intrinsic gas in the newly permitted range against EIP-170 deposit success or failure. This goes beyond local checks but does not require restructuring shared vectors, so level 2.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Parameters: "MAX_INITCODE_SIZE = 2 * MAX_CODE_SIZE" The initcode limit is defined from the EIP-170 limit; the target changes both together.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Rules 2 and 4 Initcode metering in intrinsic gas and in CREATE/CREATE2 now applies to initcode of 48–64KiB.
  • eip.md · Specification Changes parameters of both EIP-170 and EIP-3860.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: Because the target only changes these EIPs' parameters, the cases could be counted as each EIP's own boundary tests. That reading would give level 1.
Interacting EIPs: EIP-170, EIP-3860
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms1Only an existing validity bound changes. No new validation dependency or sequence is introduced, so level 1.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Rules 1: "If length of transaction data (initcode) in a create transaction exceeds MAX_INITCODE_SIZE, transaction is invalid" The validity of a create transaction depends on MAX_INITCODE_SIZE.
  • eip.md · Specification item 2 The bound rises to 0x10000.
Confidence: High
Show 21 zero-score criteria
Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 3)
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes0No opcodes are added.
  • eip.md · Specification No new instructions.
Added precompiles0No precompile is added.
  • eip.md · Specification No precompiles.
Modified precompiles0No precompile changes.
  • eip.md · Specification No precompile changes.
Added system contracts0No system contract is added.
  • eip.md · Specification No system contracts.
Modified system contracts0No existing system contract changes.
  • eip.md · Specification No system contracts are touched.
EVM Gas rule changes0No execution-gas accounting rule or gas parameter changes. The code-size and initcode-size limits are validity and halting thresholds, not gas accounting rules. Gas outcomes at sizes that are newly allowed fall under the edge and rework criteria.
  • eip.md · Rationale: "Only the size limit is changed, with no other protocol modifications" No gas formula or gas parameter changes; only size limits change.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Specification / Parameters: INITCODE_WORD_COST = 2 The initcode metering formula is unchanged. It now simply applies to larger permitted sizes.
Uncertainty: Someone could read the 'as if out of gas' failure at the size limits as a gas limit. That reading would give level 1.
State-access ordering within opcode execution0No instruction's ordering of state access or gas charging changes.
  • eip.md · Specification Only two size constants change; no ordering of access or gas charging is touched.
Blob gas accounting changes0No change to blob-gas accounting.
  • eip.md · Specification Nothing related to blobs.
State gas accounting changes0The code deposit rate is unchanged and applied over a larger range. That is not a change to state-gas accounting.
  • eip.md · Rationale: "Only the size limit is changed" The code deposit cost and other state-write pricing are unchanged.
  • supporting/eip-3860.md · Motivation: "Cost for the resulting deployed code: 200 gas per byte" The existing per-byte deposit cost still applies, now to larger code.
New EVM gas refund0No new refund is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification No refund mechanism.
New transaction types0No new transaction type.
  • eip.md · Specification No new transaction envelope.
New block / header fields0No header or block field is added.
  • eip.md · Specification No header fields.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)0No schema or codec changes.
  • eip.md · Specification No serialized schema changes.
Block syncing changes0No change to block decoding or structural validation.
  • eip.md · Specification No changes to block structure or RLP.
New fork activation mechanism0Selecting constants at the fork is not an activation-specific state transition.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility: "must be activated via a network upgrade" Activation only switches the rule constants; no state migration.
Engine API changes0No change to Engine API fields or endpoints.
  • eip.md · Specification No changes to the Engine API.
Transition-tool interface changes0Choosing constants by fork needs no change to the t8n interface.
  • eip.md · Specification Only consensus constants change; no new inputs or outputs.
New invariant on pre-existing tests0No new assertion on baseline tests is needed.
  • eip.md · Specification No new output, field or storage write.
New test-framework primitives0Testing needs only new parameter values for existing size-limit tests. No new abstraction is required.
  • eip.md · Specification A change to fork-dependent constants only.
Uncertainty: If the framework hard-codes the limits instead of making them fork-dependent, a small local extension (level 1) could be needed. No framework evidence was supplied.
Cryptography0No cryptographic mechanism changes. CREATE2 hashing of larger initcode uses an unchanged primitive.
  • eip.md · Specification No cryptographic change.
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus0Every observable outcome follows from the inherited rules with the new constants. The abstract mentions only the code-size change, but the specification is explicit about both.
  • eip.md · Specification Both new constants are given explicitly; the failure modes are inherited unchanged from EIP-170 and EIP-3860.
Assessment provenance
Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@e43e899bb1 EIPS/eip-7954.md committed 2026-01-18 · information cutoff 2026-01-20T14:22:47Z
Current master · File history · blob d3dde5b7cd · sha256 1bf217c99adf
Rubric
Checklist revision 3 · ethspecs/pm@fe2f793b03
Evaluator
Opus 5.5 (claude-opus-5-5) at high effort, one tool-less call per EIP · isolation bubblewrap_claude_p_no_tools_v1
Source record
Frozen research record research/tasks/10-opus-v3-reassessment/retrospective/outputs/assessments/amsterdam/eip-7954.yaml · sha256 873f41d4f382
Supporting documents supplied with the EIP
supporting/eip-170.md, supporting/eip-3860.md
Compare EIP-7954 with other assessmentsAll Amsterdam / Glamsterdam assessments
Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

  • Added opcodes
    Introduces new opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No new opcodes are introduced.
    1
    A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
  • Modified opcodes
    Modifies pre-existing opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
    3
    At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
  • Added precompiles
    Introduces new precompiles
    Score anchors
    0
    No new precompiles are introduced.
    1
    A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
  • Modified precompiles
    Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
    1
    At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
    2
    Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
    3
    The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
  • Added system contracts
    Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
    Score anchors
    0
    No new system contracts are introduced.
    1
    A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    2
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    3
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
  • Modified system contracts
    Modifies pre-existing system contracts
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
    1
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    2
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    3
    At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

  • EVM Gas rule changes
    New EVM gas accounting rules
    Score anchors
    0
    No gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State-access ordering within opcode execution · not in checklist revision 1
    Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
    Score anchors
    0
    No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
    1
    A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
    2
    Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
    3
    The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
    • Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
    • Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
    • Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
  • Blob gas accounting changes
    New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No blob gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State gas accounting changes · not in checklist revision 1
    New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
    Score anchors
    0
    No state gas accounting changes.
    1
    An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
    2
    A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
    3
    A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
    • Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
  • New EVM gas refund
    New gas-refund mechanism
    Score anchors
    0
    No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    2
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    3
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

  • New transaction types
    Introduces a new transaction type
    Score anchors
    0
    No new transaction types are introduced.
    3
    A new transaction type is introduced.
  • New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
    Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
    Score anchors
    0
    No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
    1
    Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
    2
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
    3
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
  • New block / header fields
    Introduces new block or block header fields
    Score anchors
    0
    No new block or header fields are introduced.
    3
    A new block or header field is introduced.
  • Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
    Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
    Score anchors
    0
    No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
    3
    An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
    • "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
  • Block syncing changes
    Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    1
    A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
    3
    Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
  • New fork activation mechanism
    Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
    Score anchors
    0
    No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
    3
    Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
    • Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

  • Engine API changes
    Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
    Score anchors
    0
    No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
    1
    A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
    2
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
    3
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
  • Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
    Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
  • Transition-tool interface changes
    Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
    1
    A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    2
    Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    3
    Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    • Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

  • Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
    Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
    1
    Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
    2
    Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
    3
    Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
  • New invariant on pre-existing tests · not in checklist revision 1
    Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
    Score anchors
    0
    Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
    1
    A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
    2
    A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
    3
    Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
    • Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
  • New test-framework primitives · not in checklist revision 1
    Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
    Score anchors
    0
    Existing test primitives suffice.
    1
    Existing primitives need minor extension.
    2
    New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
    3
    New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

  • Security risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
  • Performance risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
  • Edge/boundary conditions
    Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
    Score anchors
    0
    No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
    1
    A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
    3
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
  • Cryptography
    Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
    Score anchors
    0
    No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
    2
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
    3
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

  • Cross-EIP interactions
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
    Score anchors
    0
    Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
    1
    The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
    2
    The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
    3
    The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
    • +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
    • This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
  • Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · not in checklist revision 1
    The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
    Score anchors
    0
    The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
    1
    A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
    2
    Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
    3
    A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
    • Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.