Retrospective LLM-Based Complexity Evaluations

EIP complexity assessment

EIP-7935: Set default gas limit to 60M

Assessed in Osaka / Fusaka. The score describes the EIP text available at the assessment cutoff, not the EIP as it stands today.

RetrospectiveOsaka / FusakaAssessment cutoff 2025-05-09Added after cutoffLayers: execution
LLM Completescore 10
Human Not available· Human complexity assessments were not produced for this fork; only the LLM assessment exists.

LLM assessment

Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2025-05-08 · b4197cbb94

Scope at the cutoff. At the information cutoff, EIP-7935 was a draft informational proposal asking execution-layer clients to raise the gas limit produced by their default configurations for the Fusaka release. It introduced no new protocol feature or gas-accounting rule, but called for full-block, multi-client devnet testing and incremental increases to establish that the higher operational limit was safe. The normative target was still written as XX0M, while the security section discussed testing 60M.

10LowLow
Evaluator
LLMChecklist v2
Confidence
Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff
Yes — 5 criteria affected
Plausible range
7–11 (Low)
Assessment cutoff
2025-05-09 · EIP revision b4197cbb94 (2025-05-08)
Score bands · Checklist revision 2
  • Low <12
  • Medium 12–22
  • High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

  1. Security risks3
  2. Performance risks3
  3. Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus2
  4. Edge/boundary conditions1

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: Material under-specification is present. The normative target remains XX0M even though 60M is discussed for safety testing; the affected default configurations and release timing are not enumerated; objective safety gates and the incremental increase procedure are not defined; and the interacting transaction-limit EIP is unnamed.

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (4)
  • Is the required default gas limit 60M, or another value represented by XX0M?
  • Which generated default configurations must change, and precisely when does the new default take effect relative to the fork release?
  • What workload duration, health thresholds, and pass/fail criteria establish that a candidate gas limit is safe, and what increments are required?
  • What is the numeric identifier of the proposed 30M transaction-gas-limit EIP, and what coordination beyond scheduling is required?
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (3)
  • The manifest identifies the assignment as "Set default gas limit to 60M," but the sealed EIP's title and specification retain XX0M; only its security section names 60M.
  • The backwards-compatibility section requires coordination with another EIP but gives no identifier that can be entered as a bare integer.
  • The proposal ties a client-default update to a hard-fork release without defining an activation-block consensus transition.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-7935 Osaka / Fusaka: LLM criterion scores and rationale
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Security risksUnder-specified3A substantially higher default block capacity stresses multiple critical components across execution, propagation, and consensus-client networking. The prescribed system-wide adversarial and health testing indicates security assumptions cannot be validated as a self-contained mechanism, matching score 3.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations, lines 33-37 Safety testing spans all EL/CL combinations, full synthetic blocks, network and node health, repeated patch-and-retest cycles, incremental increases, and worst-case block size relative to the CL gossip limit.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The exact target and objective safety thresholds are not normatively fixed, which limits precision about the severity of the risk.
Performance risksUnder-specified3The performance effect cannot be validated fully in isolation: it depends on sustained full blocks, heterogeneous clients, and network behavior, with an explicitly anticipated need to find and fix client bugs. This substantially affects existing execution and propagation performance and matches score 3.
  • eip.md · Motivation, lines 17-19; Security Considerations, lines 33-35 The authors expect client bugs at higher limits and require devnets covering all EL/CL client combinations, synthetic full blocks, node and network health monitoring, iterative fixes, and incremental increases.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The normative target is unresolved, so the magnitude of the load increase is not fixed even though the required system-wide validation is explicit.
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensusUnder-specified2Clients cannot baseline the required default-configuration result until they agree on the exact value. The gap is central but localized to the configured target and release coordination, so score 2 fits better than an obvious minor detail or a newly observable class of consensus behavior.
  • eip.md · Abstract, lines 12-15; Specification, lines 21-23 The abstract contains a TODO and both the abstract and normative specification use XX0M rather than a concrete default value.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations, lines 33-35 The testing plan instead names 60M, leaving the normative placeholder and the tested candidate inconsistent in the assessment-time text.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: The 60M testing reference makes the intended value inferable, but it does not replace the unresolved value in the specification.
Edge/boundary conditionsUnder-specified1Raising one block-capacity parameter creates a single boundary-prone mechanism: behavior near full blocks and resource limits must be exercised. That matches the score-1 anchor rather than multiple independently introduced mechanisms.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations, lines 33-37 The proposal requires full blocks, incremental gas-limit increases, and consideration of worst-case block size relative to the CL gossip limit.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The unresolved target value determines how close testing comes to the cited size boundary.
Cross-EIP interactionsUnder-specified1This is one limited interaction with another proposal and primarily requires scheduling and compatibility coordination, while EIP-7935 can otherwise be tested independently. The historical text does not provide the other EIP's numeric identifier, so none can be truthfully recorded in interacting_eips.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 29-31 The EIP says larger transactions admitted by the higher block limit could exceed a proposed 30M transaction gas limit and explicitly calls for the two EIPs' scheduling to be coordinated.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The interacting proposal is described but not numbered, and the exact behavior when its transaction cap is active is not specified.
Show 23 zero-score criteria
Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 2)
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes0No opcode is added.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The specification contains no opcode addition.
Modified opcodes0No pre-existing opcode behavior is modified or deprecated.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The default block gas-limit configuration update does not change the behavior of any existing opcode.
Added precompiles0No precompile is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The specified configuration update adds no precompile.
Modified precompiles0No existing precompile is modified.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The proposal does not change any precompile's logic or gas schedule.
Added system contracts0No system contract is added.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The specified configuration update deploys no contract.
Modified system contracts0No pre-existing system contract is modified directly or indirectly.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 Changing the default configured block gas limit neither changes system contract code or state nor specifies an indirect system-contract effect.
EVM Gas rule changes0Changing a default block gas-limit value does not alter EVM instruction gas charges or introduce an EVM gas-accounting mechanism, so the zero anchor applies.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The only specified action is changing the block gas-limit value generated by each execution client's default configuration.
State-access ordering within opcode execution0No opcode's state-access position or gas-charge ordering is modified.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The specification changes only the default configured gas limit and says nothing about opcode execution or state-access sequencing.
Blob gas accounting changes0No blob gas accounting changes are introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The specified configuration update concerns the ordinary block gas limit; no blob-gas rule or parameter is specified.
State gas accounting changes0No state gas accounting mechanism or rate is changed.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The proposal changes a client default for the block gas limit and does not define a cost for writing state, a state-gas budget, or a spill path.
New EVM gas refund0No new EVM gas-refund mechanism is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The specification contains only a default gas-limit configuration change and defines no refund behavior.
New transaction types0No new transaction type is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The client default update defines no transaction type.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms0A higher default block gas limit changes block capacity, not the validity rules or intrinsic gas of transactions, so the zero anchor applies.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 29-31 The EIP notes that larger transactions could interact with a separately proposed 30M transaction gas limit, but it defines no transaction validity or intrinsic-gas change of its own.
New block / header fields0No new block or header field is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The proposal changes the default value generated for the gas limit; it does not introduce a new block or header field.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)0No RLP, SSZ, or other protocol encoding change is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 Updating a value in client-specific default configuration formats does not change transaction, block, or protocol-interface encoding.
Block syncing changes0No new block RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The proposal updates the value generated in default configurations and does not alter block RLP validation.
New fork activation mechanism0Release coordination for a configuration default is not a fork-block state or internal-variable modification under this anchor.
  • eip.md · Rationale, lines 25-27 The new default is coordinated with a hard-fork release, but the EIP does not specify a state transition or internal-variable modification at the activation block.
Uncertainty: The exact release timing is unresolved, but no activation-block mechanism is described.
Engine API changes0No Engine API change is introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The only specified surface is execution-client default configuration; no Engine API endpoint, field, or communication mechanism is changed.
Transition-tool interface changes0No transition-tool interface field or mechanism is required.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The specified change is confined to execution-client default configuration values; no transition-tool input or output is added.
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests0The planned devnet campaign adds workload testing, but the proposal does not change existing test logic or validation patterns, matching score 0.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23; Security Considerations, lines 33-35 The EIP asks clients to change a generated default and proposes new multi-client, full-block operational testing; it does not introduce a new validation rule that reworks existing consensus tests.
Uncertainty: Client-specific tests of default configuration output may need a value update, but that is not a new validation mechanism under this anchor.
New invariant on pre-existing tests0Pre-existing tests gain no new invariant to assert.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The configuration recommendation does not require unrelated tests to assert any newly produced protocol property.
New test-framework primitives0The described campaign can be expressed with existing workload generation and monitoring capabilities; no new framework primitive is required by the text.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations, lines 33-35 Testing is described in terms of devnets, synthetic full blocks, and monitoring network and node health, without specifying a new reusable test abstraction.
Uncertainty: The EIP does not describe the available framework, but it also specifies no novel expectation, modifier, or helper abstraction.
Cryptography0No cryptography is introduced or modified.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 21-23 The default gas-limit update contains no cryptographic mechanism.
Assessment provenance
Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@b4197cbb94 EIPS/eip-7935.md committed 2025-05-08 · information cutoff 2025-05-09T21:56:48Z
Current master · File history · blob 09ab43dc26 · sha256 f3b99e814f33
Rubric
Checklist revision 2 · ethspecs/pm@3d8c0128c5
Evaluator
gpt-5.6-sol at xhigh reasoning effort · isolation bubblewrap_one_eip_capsule_v1
Source record
Frozen research record research/tasks/05-retrospective-complexity-assignment/outputs/fork-eips/osaka/eip-7935.yaml · sha256 59d13a25be38
Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

  • Added opcodes
    Introduces new opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No new opcodes are introduced.
    1
    A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
  • Modified opcodes
    Modifies pre-existing opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
    3
    At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
  • Added precompiles
    Introduces new precompiles
    Score anchors
    0
    No new precompiles are introduced.
    1
    A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
  • Modified precompiles
    Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
    1
    At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
    2
    Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
    3
    The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
  • Added system contracts
    Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
    Score anchors
    0
    No new system contracts are introduced.
    1
    A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    2
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    3
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
  • Modified system contracts
    Modifies pre-existing system contracts
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
    1
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    2
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    3
    At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

  • EVM Gas rule changes
    New EVM gas accounting rules
    Score anchors
    0
    No gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State-access ordering within opcode execution · Checklist revision 2 only
    Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
    Score anchors
    0
    No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
    1
    A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
    2
    Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
    3
    The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
    • Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
    • Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
    • Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
  • Blob gas accounting changes
    New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No blob gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State gas accounting changes · Checklist revision 2 only
    New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
    Score anchors
    0
    No state gas accounting changes.
    1
    An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
    2
    A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
    3
    A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
    • Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
  • New EVM gas refund
    New gas-refund mechanism
    Score anchors
    0
    No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    2
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    3
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

  • New transaction types
    Introduces a new transaction type
    Score anchors
    0
    No new transaction types are introduced.
    3
    A new transaction type is introduced.
  • New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
    Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
    Score anchors
    0
    No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
    1
    Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
    2
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
    3
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
  • New block / header fields
    Introduces new block or block header fields
    Score anchors
    0
    No new block or header fields are introduced.
    3
    A new block or header field is introduced.
  • Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
    Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
    Score anchors
    0
    No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
    3
    An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
    • "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
  • Block syncing changes
    Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    1
    A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
    3
    Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
  • New fork activation mechanism
    Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
    Score anchors
    0
    No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
    3
    Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
    • Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

  • Engine API changes
    Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
    Score anchors
    0
    No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
    1
    A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
    2
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
    3
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
  • Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
    Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
  • Transition-tool interface changes
    Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
    1
    A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    2
    Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    3
    Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    • Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

  • Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
    Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
    1
    Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
    2
    Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
    3
    Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
  • New invariant on pre-existing tests · Checklist revision 2 only
    Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
    Score anchors
    0
    Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
    1
    A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
    2
    A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
    3
    Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
    • Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
  • New test-framework primitives · Checklist revision 2 only
    Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
    Score anchors
    0
    Existing test primitives suffice.
    1
    Existing primitives need minor extension.
    2
    New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
    3
    New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

  • Security risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
  • Performance risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
  • Edge/boundary conditions
    Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
    Score anchors
    0
    No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
    1
    A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
    3
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
  • Cryptography
    Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
    Score anchors
    0
    No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
    2
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
    3
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

  • Cross-EIP interactions
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
    Score anchors
    0
    Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
    1
    The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
    2
    The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
    3
    The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
    • +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
    • This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
  • Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · Checklist revision 2 only
    The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
    Score anchors
    0
    The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
    1
    A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
    2
    Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
    3
    A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
    • Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.