Retrospective LLM-Based Complexity Evaluations

EIP complexity assessment

EIP-7935: Set default gas limit to 60M

Assessed in Osaka / Fusaka. The score describes the EIP text available at the assessment cutoff, not the EIP as it stands today.

RetrospectiveOsaka / FusakaAssessment cutoff 2025-05-09Added after cutoffLayers: execution
LLM Completescore 6
Human Not available· Human complexity assessments were not produced for this fork; only the LLM assessment exists.

LLM assessment

Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2025-05-08 · b4197cbb94

Scope at the cutoff. EIP-7935, at this revision, is an Informational EIP. It asks execution-layer clients to raise the gas limit in their default configurations from the current 36M on mainnet to a target of 'XX0M' by the Fusaka release. The Security Considerations section names 60M as the value to test. It adds no consensus rule, transaction type, opcode, header field or encoding change. The specification only asks clients to update their default configuration values. The required work is mostly performance and safety validation: devnets running all EL/CL client combinations with full synthetic blocks, a check of worst-case block size against the 10 MiB CL gossip limit, and coordinated scheduling with a separately proposed 30M transaction gas limit cap.

6LowLow
Evaluator
LLMChecklist v3
Confidence
Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff
Yes — 2 criteria affected
Plausible range
4–6 (Low)
Assessment cutoff
2025-05-09 · EIP revision b4197cbb94 (2025-05-08)
Score bands · Checklist revision 3
  • Low <12
  • Medium 12–22
  • High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

  1. Performance risks3
  2. Security risks2
  3. Cross-EIP interactions1

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: The recommended gas limit is still a placeholder ('XX0M') in the title, abstract and specification. Security Considerations names 60M as the value to test. The schedule for the incremental increase and the conditions for moving from the 36M baseline are not specified. None of this is consensus-visible, but it sets how large the performance and security validation target is.

Plausible total

4–6
recorded score 6 · plausible tiers Low

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (3)
  • What is the final recommended default gas limit: 60M or another 'XX0M' value?
  • What is the incremental increase schedule, and what are the go/no-go criteria for each step?
  • Which EIP defines the 30M transaction gas cap, and is it scheduled for the same fork?
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (3)
  • The title, abstract and specification say 'XX0M' (a TODO placeholder), while Security Considerations tests 60M.
  • The EIP is Informational and changes client defaults rather than consensus rules, yet it asks to be included in a hard fork as a commitment.
  • It does not say whether the 10 MiB gossip limit or the 1.79 MiB worst-case block size will be re-checked at the final value.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-7935 Osaka / Fusaka: LLM criterion scores and rationale
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Performance risksUnder-specified3Raising the default gas limit from 36M to about 60M raises the resource bound for every existing workload. The affected assumptions are worst-case block execution and validation time within a slot, state and IO load, and block size versus the 10 MiB CL gossip limit. The EIP itself requires adversarial and full-block stress testing across EL/CL client combinations and networking. This meets level 3: adversarial workload combinations need integrated stress testing across distinct execution and client subsystems.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — "Devnets will be stood up with nodes running all combinations of EL and CL clients in order to test if a gas limit of 60M is safe" Requires integrated stress testing across all client combinations at the higher limit.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — "Synthetic transactions will be created until blocks are full, and network and node health monitored" Full-block workloads at 60M must be validated for block execution, node health and networking.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — "current worst-case block size of 1.79 MiB would reach the current 10MiB CL gossip limit" Adversarial block-size constructions couple the execution gas limit with the CL gossip size bound.
  • eip.md · Motivation — "we expect to find bugs in clients at higher gas limits" Higher execution capacity is expected to expose new client performance issues.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The EIP changes only defaults, not consensus rules. It also says the block-size coupling should not matter below 150M, which could argue for level 2 (bounded interaction).
Security risksUnder-specified2The larger gas limit changes the worst-case resource bound that other components rely on. These include CL gossip message size and node liveness under maximally expensive blocks. This is a bounded interaction that needs targeted adversarial integration review. It does not change shared authorization or trust invariants.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — "Adversarial block constructions that would increase the worst-case size ... should not be a factor below 150M gas" The increase changes the DoS bound on worst-case block size and execution, which interacts with the CL gossip size limit.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — "If bugs are discovered, client teams will patch them" Validating safety at the new limit is part of the planned process.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: A safety analysis limited to DoS could be seen as overlapping with PERF. Level 1 is possible if the gossip-limit margin is accepted as already researched.
Cross-EIP interactions1The only stated interaction is with the proposed 30M per-transaction gas limit. Testing needs only local compatibility checks: blocks with a 60M limit holding transactions near or above 30M, with the cap active or inactive. Otherwise the target can be tested independently.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility — "new transactions could exceed the proposed 30M transaction gas limit, so the scheduling of these two EIPs should be coordinated" Interacts with a separately proposed per-transaction gas cap. That EIP's number is not given and it is not in the candidate list.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The cap EIP's text is not supplied. Its exact semantics, and whether it is scheduled in the same fork, are evidence gaps.
Show 25 zero-score criteria
Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 3)
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes0None introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification No opcodes are introduced.
Modified opcodes0No instruction semantics or availability change.
  • eip.md · Specification No opcode semantics change. The GASLIMIT opcode's semantics are unchanged; only its observed value may differ.
Added precompiles0None introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification No precompiles are introduced.
Modified precompiles0None modified.
  • eip.md · Specification No precompile changes.
Added system contracts0None introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification No system contracts are introduced.
Modified system contracts0No modifications.
  • eip.md · Specification No system contract is referenced.
EVM Gas rule changes0The block gas limit is still set by validators under the unchanged adjustment rule. Changing a client's default target does not change any execution-gas accounting rule or parameter in consensus.
  • eip.md · Specification — "update the gas limit value generated in their default configurations" Only the default configuration value changes. No gas charging, metering or consensus limit rule changes.
Uncertainty: One could argue that the effective block gas limit is a 'limit'. However, the EIP changes defaults, not a consensus parameter.
State-access ordering within opcode execution0No instruction ordering is changed or introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification No change to how instructions access state or charge gas.
Blob gas accounting changes0No blob-gas accounting changes.
  • eip.md · Specification Only the execution gas limit default is mentioned. Blob gas is not mentioned.
State gas accounting changes0No state-gas accounting rule changes.
  • eip.md · Specification No state-gas accounting is defined or changed.
New EVM gas refund0No new refund mechanism.
  • eip.md · Specification No refund mechanism is mentioned.
New transaction types0None introduced.
  • eip.md · Specification No new transaction envelope.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms0No consensus transaction-validity or intrinsic-gas rule is changed by this EIP. A larger block gas limit only lets bigger transactions fit under the unchanged block gas limit check.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility — "new transactions could exceed the proposed 30M transaction gas limit" The transaction gas cap is defined by a different proposal. This EIP does not change any validity rule.
New block / header fields0None added.
  • eip.md · Specification No header fields are added.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)0No serialized object changes.
  • eip.md · Specification No schema or codec changes.
Block syncing changes0The gas limit header validation rules are unchanged.
  • eip.md · Specification No change to block decoding or structural validation.
New fork activation mechanism0No activation-specific EL state transition is required.
  • eip.md · Rationale — "tying a new value to a hard fork release" The fork is only a coordination point for releasing new defaults. It involves no state transition.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — "the gas limit will be increased incrementally" The increase happens gradually through the existing gas limit voting, not through an activation transition.
Engine API changes0No Engine API fields or endpoints change.
  • eip.md · Specification No Engine API change is mentioned.
Transition-tool interface changes0No transition-tool field or mechanism change is required.
  • eip.md · Specification Only client default configurations change. The t8n tool already takes the gas limit as an input.
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests0Consensus tests set their own environment or genesis gas limits. A change to client defaults does not require reworking baseline test inputs or expected results.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility — "A higher gas limit should not break any existing contracts" No behavioral change is described for existing execution.
Uncertainty: No test suite was supplied. Any test that relied on a client default instead of an explicit gas limit would be a local issue.
New invariant on pre-existing tests0No new assertion is needed in baseline tests.
  • eip.md · Specification No new output, field or commitment is introduced.
New test-framework primitives0The block gas limit is already a parameter of existing test construction. No new primitive is architecturally required for EL consensus tests.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations — "Synthetic transactions will be created until blocks are full" The validation uses full synthetic blocks on devnets, not new consensus test abstractions.
Uncertainty: Performance or benchmark tooling for filling 60M blocks may need local extensions. This is not established by the supplied text.
Edge/boundary conditions0No consensus rule with boundary-sensitive outcomes is introduced or changed. The new default target is a parameter value, not a new rule.
  • eip.md · Specification Changes a default value only. The gas limit adjustment and validation rules are unchanged.
Uncertainty: Block-full boundary cases at 60M are useful for performance work but are not a changed consensus boundary.
Cryptography0No cryptographic mechanism changes.
  • eip.md · Specification No cryptographic content.
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus0The value placeholder and the incremental increase schedule are open. However, client default configuration is not a consensus-visible protocol outcome, so no unresolved consensus outcome is identified.
  • eip.md · Abstract — "<!--TODO: Fill in recommended gas limit-->" The recommended value is still a placeholder ('XX0M'). Security Considerations names 60M.
  • eip.md · Specification — "Execution layer clients have different configuration formats" Defaults are client configuration, not a consensus outcome.
Uncertainty: The XX0M/60M inconsistency is a real gap in the document, but it affects planning and validation targets, not consensus results.
Assessment provenance
Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@b4197cbb94 EIPS/eip-7935.md committed 2025-05-08 · information cutoff 2025-05-09T21:56:48Z
Current master · File history · blob 09ab43dc26 · sha256 f3b99e814f33
Rubric
Checklist revision 3 · ethspecs/pm@fe2f793b03
Evaluator
Opus 5.5 (claude-opus-5-5) at high effort, one tool-less call per EIP · isolation bubblewrap_claude_p_no_tools_v1
Source record
Frozen research record research/tasks/10-opus-v3-reassessment/retrospective/outputs/assessments/osaka/eip-7935.yaml · sha256 6c61cd04a2e9
Compare EIP-7935 with other assessmentsAll Osaka / Fusaka assessments
Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

  • Added opcodes
    Introduces new opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No new opcodes are introduced.
    1
    A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
  • Modified opcodes
    Modifies pre-existing opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
    3
    At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
  • Added precompiles
    Introduces new precompiles
    Score anchors
    0
    No new precompiles are introduced.
    1
    A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
  • Modified precompiles
    Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
    1
    At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
    2
    Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
    3
    The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
  • Added system contracts
    Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
    Score anchors
    0
    No new system contracts are introduced.
    1
    A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    2
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    3
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
  • Modified system contracts
    Modifies pre-existing system contracts
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
    1
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    2
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    3
    At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

  • EVM Gas rule changes
    New EVM gas accounting rules
    Score anchors
    0
    No gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State-access ordering within opcode execution · not in checklist revision 1
    Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
    Score anchors
    0
    No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
    1
    A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
    2
    Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
    3
    The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
    • Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
    • Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
    • Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
  • Blob gas accounting changes
    New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No blob gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State gas accounting changes · not in checklist revision 1
    New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
    Score anchors
    0
    No state gas accounting changes.
    1
    An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
    2
    A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
    3
    A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
    • Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
  • New EVM gas refund
    New gas-refund mechanism
    Score anchors
    0
    No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    2
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    3
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

  • New transaction types
    Introduces a new transaction type
    Score anchors
    0
    No new transaction types are introduced.
    3
    A new transaction type is introduced.
  • New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
    Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
    Score anchors
    0
    No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
    1
    Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
    2
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
    3
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
  • New block / header fields
    Introduces new block or block header fields
    Score anchors
    0
    No new block or header fields are introduced.
    3
    A new block or header field is introduced.
  • Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
    Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
    Score anchors
    0
    No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
    3
    An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
    • "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
  • Block syncing changes
    Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    1
    A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
    3
    Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
  • New fork activation mechanism
    Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
    Score anchors
    0
    No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
    3
    Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
    • Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

  • Engine API changes
    Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
    Score anchors
    0
    No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
    1
    A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
    2
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
    3
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
  • Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
    Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
  • Transition-tool interface changes
    Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
    1
    A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    2
    Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    3
    Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    • Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

  • Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
    Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
    1
    Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
    2
    Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
    3
    Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
  • New invariant on pre-existing tests · not in checklist revision 1
    Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
    Score anchors
    0
    Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
    1
    A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
    2
    A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
    3
    Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
    • Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
  • New test-framework primitives · not in checklist revision 1
    Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
    Score anchors
    0
    Existing test primitives suffice.
    1
    Existing primitives need minor extension.
    2
    New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
    3
    New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

  • Security risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
  • Performance risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
  • Edge/boundary conditions
    Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
    Score anchors
    0
    No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
    1
    A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
    3
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
  • Cryptography
    Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
    Score anchors
    0
    No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
    2
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
    3
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

  • Cross-EIP interactions
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
    Score anchors
    0
    Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
    1
    The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
    2
    The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
    3
    The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
    • +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
    • This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
  • Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · not in checklist revision 1
    The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
    Score anchors
    0
    The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
    1
    A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
    2
    Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
    3
    A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
    • Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.