Retrospective LLM-Based Complexity Evaluations

EIP complexity assessment

EIP-7934: RLP Execution Block Size Limit

Assessed in Osaka / Fusaka. The score describes the EIP text available at the assessment cutoff, not the EIP as it stands today.

RetrospectiveOsaka / FusakaAssessment cutoff 2025-05-09Added after cutoffLayers: execution
LLM Completescore 7
Human Not available· Human complexity assessments were not produced for this fork; only the LLM assessment exists.

LLM assessment

Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2025-05-06 · 040800a325

Scope at the cutoff. At the historical cutoff, EIP-7934 proposed a protocol-level upper bound of 10 MiB minus a 512 KiB safety margin on the RLP-encoded execution block. Block builders had to stay at or below that bound, while validating nodes had to reject blocks above it and apply the check during validation and propagation. The limit was explicitly independent of gas metrics and added no new encoding, transaction, header, or EVM feature.

7LowLow
Evaluator
LLMChecklist v2
Confidence
Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff
Yes — 3 criteria affected
Plausible range
7–9 (Low)
Assessment cutoff
2025-05-09 · EIP revision 040800a325 (2025-05-06)
Score bands · Checklist revision 2
  • Low <12
  • Medium 12–22
  • High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

  1. Security risks2
  2. Block syncing changes1
  3. Patterns affecting pre-existing tests1
  4. Performance risks1

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: The draft's prose and pseudocode use inconsistent names for the 10 MiB upper limit and 512 KiB margin, and GOSSIP_UPPER_LIMIT is not defined in the code fragment. It also does not formally define the full Block serialization scope or whether each validation and propagation path measures received bytes or a canonical re-encoding. The intended 10 MiB minus 512 KiB, strict greater-than rule is nevertheless apparent.

Plausible total

7–9
recorded score 7 · plausible tiers Low

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (3)
  • Is MAX_RLP_BLOCK_SIZE normatively 10,485,760 minus 524,288 bytes despite the pseudocode's undefined GOSSIP_UPPER_LIMIT name?
  • Does block size mean the canonical result of rlp.encode(Block), or the exact received byte sequence, and which execution-block components are included in Block?
  • At which validation and propagation entry points must the limit be enforced, and do exact-size test construction needs require a reusable test helper?
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (2)
  • The prose and pseudocode disagree on constant names, and GOSSIP_UPPER_LIMIT is undefined in the pseudocode.
  • The draft does not formally distinguish raw received RLP length from canonical re-encoding length at all enforcement paths.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-7934 Osaka / Fusaka: LLM criterion scores and rationale
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Security risks2An incorrect or inconsistent implementation can make clients disagree on block validity or allow the network attacks the cap is intended to prevent. The rule touches a limited set of critical block-handling components and calls for targeted boundary review or fuzzing, matching score 2 rather than the broad multi-component score 3.
  • eip.md · Motivation, lines 19-26 Oversized blocks are described as creating propagation failures, temporary forks, reorgs, fragmentation, and denial-of-service risks.
  • eip.md · Changes to Protocol Behavior and Protocol Adjustment, lines 50-58 Builders, validators, and propagation paths must consistently enforce the new consensus-validity boundary.
Confidence: High
Block syncing changesUnder-specified1This is a single simple block RLP validation mechanism requiring client agreement on block acceptance, exactly matching the score-1 anchor.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap and Protocol Adjustment, lines 30-47 and 55-58 The EIP adds one RLP block-length validity check that every client must apply during block validation and propagation.
Confidence: High
Uncertainty: The draft's inconsistent constant names leave a minor specification ambiguity, addressed separately under under-specification.
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests1The new validation rule affects a narrow subset of pre-existing block tests: those with an RLP encoding above the cap. That fits the minor-subset anchor rather than broad test rework.
  • eip.md · Backwards Compatibility, lines 66-68 Blocks above the new limit cease to be valid, so existing vectors containing such blocks would change outcome.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The sealed package does not enumerate historical test vectors, so the affected subset is inferred from the validity rule.
Performance risks1The added size calculation and rejection path warrant performance validation, but the check is self-contained and can be benchmarked in isolation. This matches score 1.
  • eip.md · Motivation, lines 19-26 The EIP is motivated by oversized blocks slowing propagation and block validation and by the resulting instability and denial-of-service exposure.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap, lines 38-47 The introduced mechanism is a length check over the RLP encoding of one block.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: The EIP does not specify whether clients must re-encode a block or may track encoded length, so implementation cost can vary.
Edge/boundary conditions1The proposal introduces one boundary-prone mechanism, with tests needed below, exactly at, and above the byte limit. This matches score 1.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap, lines 32-47 A block is invalid only when its RLP-encoded length is greater than the derived maximum, making equality and one byte over distinct outcomes.
Confidence: High
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensusUnder-specified1A few localized drafting details are unresolved, but the numeric values, subtraction, strict greater-than comparison, and intended re-encoding operation make the intended rule apparent. This fits score 1.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap, lines 32-47 The prose defines MAX_BLOCK_SIZE and MARGIN, while the pseudocode instead uses SAFETY_MARGIN and an otherwise undefined GOSSIP_UPPER_LIMIT; it also types the measured value only as Block.
  • eip.md · Changes to Protocol Behavior and Protocol Adjustment, lines 50-58 The draft requires the limit during validation and propagation but does not further define whether enforcement measures received bytes or canonical re-encoding at each entry point.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: Exact serialization scope, constant nomenclature, and enforcement point should be normalized before cross-client vectors are baselined.
Show 22 zero-score criteria
Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 2)
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes0No EVM opcode is introduced, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 28-58 The proposal specifies only a whole-block RLP length check and corresponding block rejection.
Modified opcodes0No pre-existing opcode behavior is modified or deprecated, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Protocol Adjustment, lines 55-58 The rule is an independent block validation and propagation check rather than an EVM execution change.
Added precompiles0No precompile is introduced, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 28-58 The specified feature is a client block-size validation check and contains no callable EVM component.
Modified precompiles0No pre-existing precompile is modified, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 28-58 The complete specified change is a whole-block size cap with no precompile logic or gas schedule changes.
Added system contracts0No system contract is introduced, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 28-58 The specification adds constants and a client-side block validity check, not contract code or state.
Modified system contracts0The proposal neither identifies nor directly or indirectly changes a pre-existing system contract, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Changes to Protocol Behavior, lines 50-53 The behavioral change is confined to block construction and rejection based on encoded size.
EVM Gas rule changes0The proposal adds no EVM gas accounting rule, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Protocol Adjustment, lines 55-58 The new block-size limit is explicitly stated to apply independently of gas-related metrics.
State-access ordering within opcode execution0No opcode execution, state access, or gas-charge ordering is changed, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap and Changes to Protocol Behavior, lines 30-53 The specified operation measures the RLP encoding of a whole block and changes only block construction and validation.
Blob gas accounting changes0There is no blob gas accounting change, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Protocol Adjustment, lines 55-58 The size check is independent of gas-related metrics, and no blob-gas rule is specified.
State gas accounting changes0No state gas cost, charging site, budget, reservoir, or spill rule is changed, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Protocol Adjustment, lines 55-58 The proposal separates its block-byte limit from all gas-related metrics and specifies no state-write charge.
New EVM gas refund0The proposal introduces no gas-refund mechanism, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 28-58 The complete specified change is a block-size validity comparison independent of gas metrics.
New transaction types0No new transaction type is introduced, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap and Changes to Protocol Behavior, lines 30-53 The proposal constrains total encoded block size and adds no transaction envelope or transaction semantics.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms0The EIP does not change any transaction type's validity rules or intrinsic gas calculation, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap and Protocol Adjustment, lines 30-36 and 55-58 Invalidity is defined for an oversized block as a whole and is explicitly independent of gas-related metrics.
Uncertainty: Transactions can contribute bytes to the block total, but their individual validity is unchanged.
New block / header fields0No block or header field is introduced, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap, lines 30-47 The proposal introduces validation constants and computes size from the existing Block object without adding a block field.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)0Using an existing encoding as the input to a validity limit is not an encoding-format change, so the zero anchor applies.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap, lines 30-47 The new rule measures the length produced by the existing RLP encoding of a block; it does not replace or modify that encoding.
New fork activation mechanism0No state, internal variable, or similar value is modified at a fork activation block, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Specification, lines 28-58 The specification defines a standing validity check and does not prescribe an activation-block state or internal-variable modification.
Uncertainty: The historical draft does not specify fork scheduling, but that omission does not itself create an activation-state mechanism.
Engine API changes0No Engine API change is specified, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Changes to Protocol Behavior and Protocol Adjustment, lines 50-58 The stated changes concern block creation, validation, and propagation, with no new API field, endpoint, or communication mechanism.
Transition-tool interface changes0The rule consumes the already encoded block and requires no specified transition-tool interface modification, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Protocol Adjustment, lines 55-58 Clients must add the size check during block validation and propagation; no transition-tool field or interface mechanism is introduced.
Uncertainty: The EIP does not state how a transition tool would be used for this outer block-validation rule.
New invariant on pre-existing tests0Oversized vectors change validity and are counted under test-pattern rework; unrelated tests do not gain a new produced value to assert. This matches the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Changes to Protocol Behavior, lines 50-53 The EIP changes builder acceptance and node rejection behavior but defines no additional result or output for unrelated tests to assert.
Uncertainty: The EIP does not describe a test-suite representation, but no new assertion-bearing protocol output is specified.
New test-framework primitivesUnder-specified0Boundary blocks and expected validity can be expressed without a new expectation type, modifier, or permanent framework abstraction, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Block Size Cap, lines 30-48 The normative behavior is expressible as an RLP encoding length comparison against one constant.
Uncertainty: A convenience helper for constructing exact-size blocks may be useful, but the EIP does not establish that a new framework primitive is required.
Cryptography0No cryptographic mechanism or cryptographic functionality is introduced or modified, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Abstract and Specification, lines 13-15 and 28-58 The proposal consists solely of an RLP-encoded block-size cap and rejection rule.
Cross-EIP interactions0On the sealed evidence, the execution-block validity rule is independently testable and has no identified interaction with another EIP, matching the zero anchor.
  • eip.md · Rationale, lines 60-64 The cap is motivated by a consensus-layer gossip constraint, but the proposal names no EIP dependency, modification, or conflict.
Uncertainty: The EIP refers generically to consensus-layer gossip behavior without identifying a numbered EIP.
Assessment provenance
Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@040800a325 EIPS/eip-7934.md committed 2025-05-06 · information cutoff 2025-05-09T21:56:48Z
Current master · File history · blob 028e8657ab · sha256 29c5f346e4a9
Rubric
Checklist revision 2 · ethspecs/pm@3d8c0128c5
Evaluator
gpt-5.6-sol at xhigh reasoning effort · isolation bubblewrap_one_eip_capsule_v1
Source record
Frozen research record research/tasks/05-retrospective-complexity-assignment/outputs/fork-eips/osaka/eip-7934.yaml · sha256 4e5bd09270a4
Compare EIP-7934 with other assessmentsAll Osaka / Fusaka assessments
Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

  • Added opcodes
    Introduces new opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No new opcodes are introduced.
    1
    A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
  • Modified opcodes
    Modifies pre-existing opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
    3
    At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
  • Added precompiles
    Introduces new precompiles
    Score anchors
    0
    No new precompiles are introduced.
    1
    A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
  • Modified precompiles
    Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
    1
    At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
    2
    Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
    3
    The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
  • Added system contracts
    Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
    Score anchors
    0
    No new system contracts are introduced.
    1
    A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    2
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    3
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
  • Modified system contracts
    Modifies pre-existing system contracts
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
    1
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    2
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    3
    At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

  • EVM Gas rule changes
    New EVM gas accounting rules
    Score anchors
    0
    No gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State-access ordering within opcode execution · Checklist revision 2 only
    Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
    Score anchors
    0
    No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
    1
    A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
    2
    Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
    3
    The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
    • Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
    • Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
    • Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
  • Blob gas accounting changes
    New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No blob gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State gas accounting changes · Checklist revision 2 only
    New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
    Score anchors
    0
    No state gas accounting changes.
    1
    An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
    2
    A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
    3
    A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
    • Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
  • New EVM gas refund
    New gas-refund mechanism
    Score anchors
    0
    No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    2
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    3
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

  • New transaction types
    Introduces a new transaction type
    Score anchors
    0
    No new transaction types are introduced.
    3
    A new transaction type is introduced.
  • New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
    Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
    Score anchors
    0
    No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
    1
    Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
    2
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
    3
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
  • New block / header fields
    Introduces new block or block header fields
    Score anchors
    0
    No new block or header fields are introduced.
    3
    A new block or header field is introduced.
  • Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
    Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
    Score anchors
    0
    No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
    3
    An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
    • "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
  • Block syncing changes
    Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    1
    A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
    3
    Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
  • New fork activation mechanism
    Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
    Score anchors
    0
    No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
    3
    Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
    • Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

  • Engine API changes
    Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
    Score anchors
    0
    No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
    1
    A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
    2
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
    3
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
  • Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
    Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
  • Transition-tool interface changes
    Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
    1
    A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    2
    Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    3
    Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    • Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

  • Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
    Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
    1
    Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
    2
    Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
    3
    Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
  • New invariant on pre-existing tests · Checklist revision 2 only
    Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
    Score anchors
    0
    Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
    1
    A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
    2
    A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
    3
    Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
    • Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
  • New test-framework primitives · Checklist revision 2 only
    Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
    Score anchors
    0
    Existing test primitives suffice.
    1
    Existing primitives need minor extension.
    2
    New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
    3
    New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

  • Security risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
  • Performance risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
  • Edge/boundary conditions
    Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
    Score anchors
    0
    No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
    1
    A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
    3
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
  • Cryptography
    Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
    Score anchors
    0
    No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
    2
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
    3
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

  • Cross-EIP interactions
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
    Score anchors
    0
    Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
    1
    The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
    2
    The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
    3
    The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
    • +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
    • This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
  • Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · Checklist revision 2 only
    The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
    Score anchors
    0
    The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
    1
    A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
    2
    Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
    3
    A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
    • Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.