Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2024-12-02 · 8096a3a13a
Scope at the cutoff. This revision of EIP-7825 sets a fixed protocol-level cap of 30,000,000 gas on any single transaction's gasLimit. The cap does not depend on the block gas limit, which can still be higher. A transaction whose gasLimit exceeds 30M is rejected from the txpool. A block containing such a transaction is invalid and is rejected during validation before processing. The EIP adds no new transaction type, header field, opcode, precompile or system contract.
- Evaluator
- LLMChecklist v3
- Confidence
- Medium
- Under-specified at assessment cutoff
- Yes — 5 criteria affected
- Plausible range
- 9–14 (Low–Medium)
- Assessment cutoff
- 2025-02-21 · EIP revision
8096a3a13a(2024-12-02)
Score bands · Checklist revision 3
- Low <12
- Medium 12–22
- High ≥23
28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.
Complexity profile
Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.
Top complexity drivers
- Patterns affecting pre-existing tests2
- EVM Gas rule changes1
- New or modified transaction validity mechanisms1
- Block syncing changes1
Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes
The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.
Why: The normative rule (reject when gasLimit > 30,000,000) is clear. Missing details include: precedence relative to other validity checks, whether protocol system calls are exempt, the exact error identifier, and wording in the abstract ('gas usage') that differs from the gasLimit-based specification.
Plausible total
9–14
recorded score 11 · plausible tiers Low, Medium
Unresolved questions at the cutoff (4)
- Is the cap on the gasLimit field (Specification) or on gas actually used (Abstract)?
- Does the cap apply to protocol system calls that execute with their own gas budgets?
- What is the precedence when a transaction exceeds both the 30M cap and the available block gas, or fails intrinsic-gas checks?
- Is the error code normative, or only illustrative?
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (4)
- The Abstract says 'maximum gas usage per transaction' while the Specification checks the gasLimit field.
- The error code `MAX_GAS_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` is given only as an example ('e.g.').
- Applicability to system calls and the ordering against other validity checks are not specified.
- The section titled 'Changes to EVM Behavior' contains only txpool and block-validation rules; it changes no EVM execution.
Criterion breakdown
| Criterion | Score | Why this score | Evidence / uncertainty |
|---|---|---|---|
| Patterns affecting pre-existing tests | 2 | Baseline state and blockchain tests that set transaction gas limits above 30M must be changed to lower limits, or their expected results must change to invalid. This affects localized high-gas cases in several families: large-gas or near-block-gas-limit cases, memory/copy-expansion stress cases, deep-call and large-deployment cases. There is no common rewrite across ordinary cases, so level 2 fits. No suite was supplied, so the extent is estimated from the specification. |
Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: If many baseline fixtures use very large default gas limits, the rework could be broader (level 3). If few do, it could be narrower (level 1). |
| EVM Gas rule changesUnder-specified | 1 | The available execution gas per transaction is now bounded by a constant instead of only by the block gas limit. This changes an existing limit parameter without adding a new accounting mechanism (opcode costs, refunds and settlement are unchanged), so level 1 fits. |
Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: The cap could instead be treated purely as a transaction-validity rule (TXV), which would make this 0. |
| New or modified transaction validity mechanismsUnder-specified | 1 | Only a local bound on an existing field is added. There is no new validation dependency or sequence, and existing transaction-validity test construction can be reused. Level 1 fits. |
Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: The ordering against other gas-limit checks (for example gasLimit > block gas limit, or intrinsic gas) is not specified, which may need dedicated cases (level 2). |
| Block syncing changesUnder-specified | 1 | One simple, local block-validation rule is added: a check on a single transaction field, done before processing and tested through block import. Level 1 fits. |
Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: This could be seen as an ordinary transaction-validity rule rather than structural block validation (0). |
| New test-framework primitives | 1 | The framework needs a local extension: a new transaction-exception value and a fork-dependent cap constant. No new abstraction is required. |
Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: This could be 0 if a new exception value is not considered an extension of a primitive. |
| Security risks | 1 | The new check can be validated locally. The security risk is a consensus split if clients enforce the boundary inconsistently (> versus >=, or not at all at block import). No assumptions used by other components change. |
Confidence: Medium |
| Performance risks | 1 | The changed resource bound is the maximum gas per transaction. Worst-case single-transaction benchmarks must be re-baselined to the 30M cap, and benchmark workloads that use larger single transactions must be split. These are component-level checks that do not add new resource coupling. |
Confidence: Medium |
| Edge/boundary conditions | 1 | There is one boundary-sensitive mechanism: the per-transaction gasLimit threshold at 30,000,000. It must be tested with block gas limits above and below the cap and across transaction types, but it remains a single mechanism. |
Confidence: High |
| Cross-EIP interactions | 1 | The cap must be checked for compatibility across all existing typed transactions and alongside the existing transaction gasLimit-versus-block-gas-limit rule. These are local compatibility checks, and the cap can otherwise be tested independently. No candidate EIPs were supplied. |
Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: Interactions with intrinsic or floor gas rules that might require gasLimit > 30M for large calldata or initcode are not discussed in the supplied text. |
| Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensusUnder-specified | 1 | Several localized details are omitted: the precedence of this check relative to other validity checks, whether protocol system calls are exempt, and the exact error identifier. The normative Specification section consistently uses gasLimit > 30M, which supports one intended outcome for consensus validity. Level 1 fits. |
Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: If the 'gas usage' wording in the abstract were taken as normative, competing outcomes would arise (level 2). |
Show 18 zero-score criteria
| Criterion | Score | Why this score | Evidence / uncertainty |
|---|---|---|---|
| Added opcodes | 0 | None. |
|
| Modified opcodes | 0 | Opcode semantics are unchanged. The GASLIMIT opcode still reports the block gas limit. |
|
| Added precompiles | 0 | None. |
|
| Modified precompiles | 0 | None. |
|
| Added system contracts | 0 | None. |
|
| Modified system contractsUnder-specified | 0 | No system contract rules change. Whether the cap applies to system calls is not stated (see UNSP), but the cap is defined for transactions only. |
Uncertainty: If the cap were read as applying to system calls, existing system-call conventions might be affected. |
| State-access ordering within opcode execution | 0 | No opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes. |
|
| Blob gas accounting changes | 0 | No blob-gas accounting rule changes. |
|
| State gas accounting changes | 0 | State-write accounting is unchanged. |
|
| New EVM gas refund | 0 | No new refund mechanism. |
|
| New transaction types | 0 | None. |
|
| New block / header fields | 0 | None. |
|
| Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ) | 0 | No schema or codec change. Only the range of valid values for an existing field changes. |
|
| New fork activation mechanism | 0 | Activation only selects the new rule. There is no one-time state transition. |
|
| Engine API changes | 0 | No Engine API field or endpoint changes. Payloads with an oversized transaction are rejected as invalid through the existing status rules. |
|
| Transition-tool interface changes | 0 | The cap is a fork-dependent constant. Rejected transactions are reported through the existing rejection or exception reporting. No interface change is required. |
Uncertainty: A new error identifier (`MAX_GAS_LIMIT_EXCEEDED`) may need to be mapped in exception reporting. That is a value, not a field change. |
| New invariant on pre-existing tests | 0 | Baseline tests need no new assertion. Changed validity outcomes are rework, scored under PAT. |
|
| Cryptography | 0 | No cryptographic changes. |
|
Assessment provenance
- Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@8096a3a13aEIPS/eip-7825.md committed 2024-12-02 · information cutoff 2025-02-21T01:11:23Z- Rubric
- Checklist revision 3 ·
ethspecs/pm@fe2f793b03 - Evaluator
- Opus 5.5 (
claude-opus-5-5) at high effort, one tool-less call per EIP · isolationbubblewrap_claude_p_no_tools_v1 - Source record
- Frozen research record
research/tasks/10-opus-v3-reassessment/retrospective/outputs/assessments/osaka/eip-7825.yaml· sha2566ae1ed579831