EIP complexity assessment

EIP-7645: Alias ORIGIN to SENDER

Assessed in Hegotá. The score describes the EIP text available at the snapshot, not the EIP as it stands today.

ProspectiveHegotáSnapshot 2026-08-25PFI at snapshotLayers: execution

LLM Completescore 11

Human Available in open PRscore 8 · Checklist revision 2· ethspecs/pm #113

LLM · Checklist revision 22026-08-26 · Original snapshot · 11 Human · Checklist revision 2Available in open PR · 8 CompareHuman vs LLM · same checklist revision

Evaluated on: 2026-08-26 · Spec revision: 2026-08-25 · ac450a4ab2 · Inclusion status at snapshot: PFI

Scope at the cutoff. Execution-layer assessment of the sealed EIP-7645 snapshot. The proposal changes the existing ORIGIN opcode (0x32) to return the current execution frame's SENDER/CALLER value in all contexts, while leaving transaction structure, validation, and processing otherwise unchanged. The package's supporting evidence is used only for the explicitly linked account- abstraction interactions.

11LowLow

Evaluator: LLMChecklist v2
Confidence: Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes — 4 criteria affected
Plausible range: 9–14 (Low–Medium)
Snapshot: 2026-08-25 · EIP revision ac450a4ab2 (2026-08-25)

Score bands · Checklist revision 2

Low <12
Medium 12–22
High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: The normative opcode result is precise, but the package does not inventory affected pre-existing tests or deployed security patterns, contains inconsistent backwards-compatibility statements, provides no implementation or devnet/open-question evidence, and does not identify the additional account-abstraction proposals covered by its broad interaction claim.

Plausible total

9–14
recorded score 11 · plausible tiers Low, Medium

Affected criteria (4)

Patterns affecting pre-existing tests (1)
Security risks (3)
Cross-EIP interactions (2)
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus (0)

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (4)

Which pre-existing execution test vectors exercise ORIGIN in nested call contexts and therefore require changed expected results?
Which existing contract authorization, sandwich-protection, or reentrancy patterns materially rely on ORIGIN differing from SENDER?
Have clients or devnets exposed any constructible case not resolved by the as-if-SENDER rule? The sealed package provides no such process evidence.
Which additional account-abstraction EIPs are included in the phrase "all or most account abstraction proposals," and how many require coordinated cases?

Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (3)

Backwards Compatibility first says the change is not fully backwards compatible and affects contracts relying on the ORIGIN/SENDER distinction, then ends with "No backward compatibility issues found."
Security Considerations acknowledges possible harm to existing ORIGIN use but states that a clear negative example had not yet been identified, leaving the affected security population unquantified.
The EIP's broad reference to all or most account-abstraction proposals exceeds the three proposals identified by number in the sealed evidence.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-7645 Hegotá: LLM criterion scores and rationale
Criterion	Score	Why this score	Evidence / uncertainty
Modified opcodes	3	A pre-existing opcode's non-gas behavior and observable result are directly modified, which maps to the row's score-3 anchor. Exceptional score: Not applicable; the score is not 4.	eip.md · Specification — Definition Change; EVM Implementation ORIGIN (0x32) must cease returning the original transaction initiator and instead push the current call's sender, as if SENDER/CALLER executed. Confidence: High Uncertainty: None; this is the proposal's explicit normative change.
Security risksUnder-specified	3	Taken together, the sealed evidence shows that making ORIGIN equal CALLER in all call frames substantially changes a security-critical identity invariant across multiple call mechanisms and ORIGIN-dependent authorization patterns. Incorrect implementation or incomplete compatibility analysis therefore warrants extensive security review and fuzzing. Exceptional score: Not applicable; the score is not 4.	eip.md · Backwards Compatibility Contracts relying on the ORIGIN/SENDER distinction for logic or security are explicitly stated to be affected. eip.md · Security Considerations The EIP aims to remove ORIGIN-specific vulnerabilities but acknowledges possible negative effects on existing ORIGIN misuse and says no clear example had yet been identified. supporting/eip-3074.md · Rationale — Allowing tx.origin as Signer; Security Considerations — Allowing tx.origin as Signer Package evidence identifies nested msg.sender-equals-tx.origin behavior as capable of breaking atomic-sandwich protections and reentrancy guards. Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: The EIP supplies no affected-contract inventory and concedes that a clear negative legacy example had not been identified, so practical prevalence is unresolved even though the altered invariant is explicit.
Edge/boundary conditions	2	Multiple call-context boundaries must be covered because sender propagation differs across the four call mechanisms and across nested frames. The EIP identifies these cases directly, and none is shown to need an elevated case count beyond that bounded matrix. Exceptional score: Not applicable; the score is not 4.	eip.md · Test Cases The test matrix explicitly spans CALL, STATICCALL, DELEGATECALL, and CALLCODE, both direct and multi-hop, with equality checked at each frame. eip.md · Specification — Definition Change The alias is required in all execution contexts. Confidence: High Uncertainty: Creation and other less common execution contexts are covered normatively by "all contexts" but are not enumerated in the supplied test cases.
Cross-EIP interactionsUnder-specified	2	Three identified account-abstraction proposals require coordinated consideration and interaction cases, but the interaction is localized to the ORIGIN/CALLER identity axis rather than a broad redesign of each proposal's other mechanisms. Exceptional score: Not applicable; the score is not 4.	eip.md · Motivation The proposal explicitly identifies EIPs 3074, 4337, and 7377 as account- abstraction efforts whose handling of ORIGIN is affected. supporting/eip-3074.md · Rationale — Allowing tx.origin as Signer EIP-3074 permits authorized to equal tx.origin and analyzes the resulting nested msg.sender-equals-tx.origin invariant and compatibility risks. supporting/eip-4337.md · Entire packaged file The packaged EIP-4337 document contains only moved-file metadata, while EIP-7645 itself supplies the bundler/ORIGIN interaction description. supporting/eip-7377.md · Specification — Processing — Transaction Execution; Rationale — Manipulating transaction origin EIP-7377 deliberately assigns a derived transaction origin so caller-equals-origin checks keep their intended role, directly intersecting EIP-7645's ORIGIN alias. Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: The EIP refers more broadly to all or most account-abstraction proposals, but names only three; the packaged EIP-4337 body is unavailable because the snapshot file only records that it moved. Interacting EIPs: EIP-3074, EIP-4337, EIP-7377
Patterns affecting pre-existing testsUnder-specified	1	Existing ORIGIN expected-result tests in nested call contexts must be updated, but this is a localized subset centered on one opcode rather than a broad reworking of unrelated test categories. Exceptional score: Not applicable; the score is not 4.	eip.md · Test Cases Tests must compare ORIGIN and SENDER for CALL, STATICCALL, DELEGATECALL, and CALLCODE in direct and multi-hop executions at each frame. eip.md · Backwards Compatibility Contracts relying on the distinction between ORIGIN and SENDER for logic or security are stated to be affected. Confidence: Medium Uncertainty: The package contains no inventory of pre-existing vectors, so the size of the affected subset cannot be established precisely.

Show 23 zero-score criteria

Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 2)
Criterion	Why this score	Evidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes	No opcode is added.	eip.md · Specification — Definition Change The proposal alters the already identified ORIGIN opcode at 0x32 and references the existing SENDER/CALLER opcode at 0x33. Uncertainty: None; both opcodes are presented as existing instructions.
Added precompiles	No precompile is introduced.	eip.md · Specification The specified mechanism is an opcode behavior change only. Uncertainty: None; no precompile surface appears in the specification.
Modified precompiles	No existing precompile is modified.	eip.md · Specification The specified mechanism modifies ORIGIN and no precompile logic or gas. Uncertainty: None; no precompile is identified by the proposal.
Added system contracts	No system contract is created.	eip.md · Specification The specification requires only a behavioral alteration to ORIGIN in all EVM clients. Uncertainty: None; the proposal's complete mechanism is an opcode alias.
Modified system contracts	The package provides no direct modification or package-grounded indirect effect on a pre-existing system contract.	eip.md · Specification No system contract code, state, or action is identified; only ORIGIN's EVM return value is changed. Uncertainty: Arbitrary contracts that execute ORIGIN can be affected, but no such system contract is identified in the sealed evidence and none is inferred.
EVM Gas rule changes	The proposal changes an opcode result but specifies no gas cost, schedule, charging site, or accounting mechanism change.	eip.md · Specification — Definition Change; EVM Implementation The only required opcode change is the value pushed by ORIGIN: the current call's sender, as if SENDER were executed. Uncertainty: The package supplies no gas schedule text for ORIGIN, but the normative change is expressly limited to the pushed value.
State-access ordering within opcode execution	No state access is introduced or moved, and no gas charge is repositioned relative to a state access within the modified opcode.	eip.md · Specification — EVM Implementation ORIGIN is required only to push the current call's sender address, as if SENDER had executed. Uncertainty: No state-access pseudocode is provided, but the specified operation has no state-access step to order.
Blob gas accounting changes	The proposal neither introduces nor modifies blob gas accounting.	eip.md · Specification — Transaction Validation Transactions remain validated as before, with no processing change beyond the specified EVM opcode behavior. Uncertainty: Blob gas is not discussed; the stated transaction-processing scope excludes such a change.
State gas accounting changes	No state write, state-gas charging site, state-gas rate, budget, reservoir, or spill behavior is changed.	eip.md · Specification — Definition Change; Transaction Validation The proposal changes only ORIGIN's returned value and leaves transaction processing otherwise unchanged. Uncertainty: State gas is not mentioned, consistently with the proposal's value-only opcode change.
New EVM gas refund	No refund mechanism is introduced or modified.	eip.md · Specification — EVM Implementation The EVM change is solely to substitute the current sender value for the original transaction initiator value returned by ORIGIN. Uncertainty: Refunds are not discussed, and none is implied by the specified stack-value substitution.
New transaction types	No transaction type is introduced.	eip.md · Specification — Transaction Validation Transactions must retain their prior structure and validation. Uncertainty: None; unchanged transaction structure is explicit.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms	Existing transaction validity rules and intrinsic gas calculation are expressly unchanged.	eip.md · Specification — Transaction Validation Transactions must be validated as before; transaction structure and processing logic do not change beyond the opcode behavior. Uncertainty: None; the absence of a validity change is normative.
New block / header fields	No block or header field is introduced.	eip.md · Specification The complete change is confined to ORIGIN's EVM stack result. Uncertainty: None; no block-level data is required by the mechanism.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)	No transaction, block, or interface encoding changes are introduced.	eip.md · Specification — Transaction Validation Transaction structure remains unchanged, with no processing change beyond the EVM opcode behavior. Uncertainty: Encoding formats are not discussed because the proposal changes no encoded object.
Block syncing changes	No block RLP validation or syncing mechanism is introduced.	eip.md · Specification — Transaction Validation Transactions retain their existing structure and processing logic outside the opcode behavior. Uncertainty: Block synchronization is not discussed because no block encoding or validation surface changes.
New fork activation mechanism	Ordinary activation of the new opcode rule does not add the state or internal-variable modification required by this anchor.	eip.md · Specification The proposal specifies a runtime opcode-result change and no fork-block state transition or mutation of a pre-existing internal variable. Uncertainty: The EIP does not name an activation block, but it also specifies no special activation-block action.
Engine API changes	No Engine API field, endpoint, or communication mechanism is introduced.	eip.md · Specification — EVM Implementation; Transaction Validation The complete normative change is internal EVM opcode behavior, with transaction structure and processing otherwise unchanged. Uncertainty: The Engine API is not named, and the specified change requires no new consensus-to-execution input.
Transition-tool interface changes	No transition-tool field or interface mechanism is required by the proposal.	eip.md · Specification — Transaction Validation Transaction structure and processing logic remain unchanged beyond the internal EVM opcode behavior. Uncertainty: Transition tooling is not discussed, but the normative inputs and outputs do not change.
New invariant on pre-existing tests	The package does not require tests unrelated to EIP-7645 to assert a new block-wide or transaction-wide artifact; the equality is the behavior under test in feature-specific cases.	eip.md · Test Cases The ORIGIN-equals-SENDER assertions are prescribed for direct and multi-hop call tests of this feature. Uncertainty: The package does not describe the existing test suite, but it specifies no new invariant output that every pre-existing test must gain.
New test-framework primitives	The described tests require no new expectation type, modifier, helper, or framework-level abstraction.	eip.md · Test Cases Required cases consist of ordinary call-family executions and comparisons of the values produced by two existing opcodes. Uncertainty: The package does not document a specific framework, so this conclusion is limited to the primitives demanded by the EIP text.
Performance risks	The package identifies no new mechanism requiring performance validation or interaction with existing performance behavior.	eip.md · Specification — EVM Implementation ORIGIN substitutes one already available execution-context address for another when pushing a single stack value. Uncertainty: No benchmarks are supplied, but the normative operation remains a single environmental-value push.
Cryptography	No cryptographic primitive or cryptographic behavior is introduced or modified.	eip.md · Specification — Definition Change The feature aliases the return value of one existing environmental opcode to another existing environmental opcode. Uncertainty: None; the complete specification contains no cryptographic operation.
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensusUnder-specified	The as-if-SENDER rule determines the observable result for constructible execution contexts without requiring clients to select a new value or precedence rule.	eip.md · Specification — Definition Change; EVM Implementation In all execution contexts, ORIGIN must return exactly the value SENDER/ CALLER would return in the current call. eip.md · Test Cases Direct and multi-hop expected behavior is stated as equality at the target and at each frame for all four listed call-family instructions. Uncertainty: The package has no implementation, devnet, or open-question record, and the EIP is marked Stagnant; however, no specific unresolved consensus behavior appears in the normative text.

Assessment provenance

Assessed EIP revision: ethereum/EIPs@ac450a4ab2 EIPS/eip-7645.md committed 2026-08-25 · information cutoff 2026-08-25T11:56:58Z
Current master · File history · blob 305bff3d36 · sha256 57c2d8606b73
Rubric: Checklist revision 2 · ethspecs/pm@3d8c0128c5
Evaluator: gpt-5.6-sol at xhigh reasoning effort · isolation bubblewrap_one_eip_capsule_v1
Source record: Frozen research record research/tasks/08-hegota-prospective-complexity-assessment/outputs/assessments/hegota-pfi-2026-08-26/eip-7645.yaml · sha256 0808da455469
Supporting documents in the sealed package: supporting/eip-3074.md, supporting/eip-4337.md, supporting/eip-7377.md

Evaluated on: Not recorded

8LowLow

Evaluator: HumanChecklist v2
Confidence: Not recorded
Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Not recorded in the checklist
Checklist published: 2026-08-18
Source: open ethspecs/pm pull request #113

Score bands · Checklist revision 2

Low <12
Medium 12–22
High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the Human total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

Security risks3
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests2
Modified opcodes1
Edge/boundary conditions1

Criterion breakdown

EIP-7645 Hegotá: Human criterion scores and rationale
Criterion	Score	Why this score	Notes
Security risks	3	The blast radius is unknown and has to be determined before this can ship. The EIP asserts that for existing misuse affected negatively "a clear example has yet to be identified" — but `require(tx.origin == msg.sender)` is the standard idiom for "the caller is an EOA, not a contract", and aliasing makes it unconditionally true. Every contract using that guard silently loses it, and it fails open: the contract-caller patterns it was written to block (flash-loan and reentrancy shapes) become reachable again. Nobody has measured how many deployed contracts depend on it, in what value, or what each one gates. That is a substantial change to the security assumptions of an unquantified set of live contracts, and it needs on-chain analysis plus extensive review before the change can be judged safe — not a test-suite exercise.	—
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests	2	Considerable, but one contrived category — tests that read ORIGIN. `Op.ORIGIN` appears in 9 hand-written test files, and ORIGIN in 121 files under `tests/ported_static/`. Unlike CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, ORIGIN is not woven through call-graph or state-lifecycle tests; the affected set is precisely the tests that assert on the transaction initiator. This row also absorbs the cost of re-baselining tests that exercise ORIGIN alongside other features.	—
Modified opcodes	1	ORIGIN (0x32) keeps its opcode and cost but returns the current frame's caller instead of the transaction initiator. Scored 1 rather than the anchor's binary 3 because the change is a one-line substitution with no new mechanism: the value pushed comes from a field the frame already carries. See Special Considerations — this row is defined as 0/3 with no intermediate level, which over-scores trivial opcode changes.	—
Edge/boundary conditions	1	A single boundary-prone mechanism. The cases are the top-level frame (where ORIGIN and SENDER already agree, so the change is invisible), then one frame-entry variant each for CALL, CALLCODE, DELEGATECALL and STATICCALL, plus an EIP-7702 delegated frame. Small and fixed — the EIP's own Test Cases section says exactly this.	—
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus	1	A few details unspecified but with an obvious intended reading. "Return the same value as CALLER" fully determines the pushed value in every frame type, including DELEGATECALL. The one genuine omission is that the EIP does not state a gas cost at all — not that it is unchanged, not what it becomes. Left at 1 rather than 2 because either answer is trivial on both the specs and the testing side: ORIGIN and CALLER are both fixed-cost, and settling it needs no back-and-forth with clients.	—

Show 23 zero-score criteria

Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 2)
Criterion	Why this score	Notes
Added opcodes	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Added precompiles	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Modified precompiles	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Added system contracts	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Modified system contracts	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
EVM Gas rule changes	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
State-access ordering within opcode execution	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Blob gas accounting changes	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
State gas accounting changes	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
New EVM gas refund	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
New transaction types	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
New block / header fields	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Block syncing changes	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
New fork activation mechanism	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Engine API changes	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Transition-tool interface changes	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
New invariant on pre-existing tests	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
New test-framework primitives	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Performance risks	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Cryptography	No rationale recorded.	Blank cell read as zero because the published total proves it.
Cross-EIP interactions	Not scored. ORIGIN is read by EIP-7702 delegated frames and is load-bearing in the ERC-4337 bundler-authority example the EIP cites, but in every case the consequence is only that existing tests need updating — which is already counted under "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests". There is no coordinated cross-EIP design question and no other EIP's vectors need re-deriving, so scoring here would double-count.	—

Assessment provenance

Rubric: Checklist revision 2 · ethspecs/pm@3d8c0128c5
Evaluator: STEEL team · ethspecs/pm complexity_assessments
Source record: Open pull request #113: Add EIP-7645 complexity assessment · checklist at 2f541d3e66 · updated 2026-08-18
blob 3e6403a4b0 · sha256 ea15e0e024f4
Research record: research/tasks/09-hegota-human-assessment-snapshot/outputs/assessments/eip-7645.yaml · sha256 ae8feeb96072

Both assessments applied Checklist revision 2 (28 criteria) to EIP-7645 in Hegotá. Δ is LLM minus Human.

Using the latest scored LLM evaluation for this checklist: 2026-08-26 · spec 2026-08-25 · ac450a4ab2. The Human and LLM assessments may use different spec revisions.

LLM11Low

Human8Low

Δ total+3Same tier

Criteria23/28agree exactly · 3 differ by 1 · 2 differ by 2+

Complexity profiles side by side

LLM

Human

Largest disagreements: Modified opcodes (+2), Cross-EIP interactions (+2), Patterns affecting pre-existing tests (−1), Edge/boundary conditions (+1), Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus (−1)

Show differences only (5 criteria)

Per-criterion scores, Human versus LLM, ordered by the size of the difference
Criterion	LLM	Human	Δ	Agreement	Rationale from each source
Modified opcodes	3	1	+2	Differ by 2+	Show rationale LLM A pre-existing opcode's non-gas behavior and observable result are directly modified, which maps to the row's score-3 anchor. Human ORIGIN (0x32) keeps its opcode and cost but returns the current frame's caller instead of the transaction initiator. Scored 1 rather than the anchor's binary 3 because the change is a one-line substitution with no new mechanism: the value pushed comes from a field the frame already carries. See Special Considerations — this row is defined as 0/3 with no intermediate level, which over-scores trivial opcode changes.
Cross-EIP interactions	2	0	+2	Differ by 2+	Show rationale LLM Three identified account-abstraction proposals require coordinated consideration and interaction cases, but the interaction is localized to the ORIGIN/CALLER identity axis rather than a broad redesign of each proposal's other mechanisms. Human Not scored. ORIGIN is read by EIP-7702 delegated frames and is load-bearing in the ERC-4337 bundler-authority example the EIP cites, but in every case the consequence is only that existing tests need updating — which is already counted under "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests". There is no coordinated cross-EIP design question and no other EIP's vectors need re-deriving, so scoring here would double-count.
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests	1	2	−1	Differ by 1	Show rationale LLM Existing ORIGIN expected-result tests in nested call contexts must be updated, but this is a localized subset centered on one opcode rather than a broad reworking of unrelated test categories. Human Considerable, but one contrived category — tests that read ORIGIN. `Op.ORIGIN` appears in 9 hand-written test files, and ORIGIN in 121 files under `tests/ported_static/`. Unlike CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, ORIGIN is not woven through call-graph or state-lifecycle tests; the affected set is precisely the tests that assert on the transaction initiator. This row also absorbs the cost of re-baselining tests that exercise ORIGIN alongside other features.
Edge/boundary conditions	2	1	+1	Differ by 1	Show rationale LLM Multiple call-context boundaries must be covered because sender propagation differs across the four call mechanisms and across nested frames. The EIP identifies these cases directly, and none is shown to need an elevated case count beyond that bounded matrix. Human A single boundary-prone mechanism. The cases are the top-level frame (where ORIGIN and SENDER already agree, so the change is invisible), then one frame-entry variant each for CALL, CALLCODE, DELEGATECALL and STATICCALL, plus an EIP-7702 delegated frame. Small and fixed — the EIP's own Test Cases section says exactly this.
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus	0	1	−1	Differ by 1	Show rationale LLM The as-if-SENDER rule determines the observable result for constructible execution contexts without requiring clients to select a new value or precedence rule. Human A few details unspecified but with an obvious intended reading. "Return the same value as CALLER" fully determines the pushed value in every frame type, including DELEGATECALL. The one genuine omission is that the EIP does not state a gas cost at all — not that it is unchanged, not what it becomes. Left at 1 rather than 2 because either answer is trivial on both the specs and the testing side: ORIGIN and CALLER are both fixed-cost, and settling it needs no back-and-forth with clients.
Added opcodes	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No opcode is added. Human No rationale recorded.
Added precompiles	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No precompile is introduced. Human No rationale recorded.
Modified precompiles	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No existing precompile is modified. Human No rationale recorded.
Added system contracts	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No system contract is created. Human No rationale recorded.
Modified system contracts	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM The package provides no direct modification or package-grounded indirect effect on a pre-existing system contract. Human No rationale recorded.
EVM Gas rule changes	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM The proposal changes an opcode result but specifies no gas cost, schedule, charging site, or accounting mechanism change. Human No rationale recorded.
State-access ordering within opcode execution	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No state access is introduced or moved, and no gas charge is repositioned relative to a state access within the modified opcode. Human No rationale recorded.
Blob gas accounting changes	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM The proposal neither introduces nor modifies blob gas accounting. Human No rationale recorded.
State gas accounting changes	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No state write, state-gas charging site, state-gas rate, budget, reservoir, or spill behavior is changed. Human No rationale recorded.
New EVM gas refund	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No refund mechanism is introduced or modified. Human No rationale recorded.
New transaction types	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No transaction type is introduced. Human No rationale recorded.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM Existing transaction validity rules and intrinsic gas calculation are expressly unchanged. Human No rationale recorded.
New block / header fields	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No block or header field is introduced. Human No rationale recorded.
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No transaction, block, or interface encoding changes are introduced. Human No rationale recorded.
Block syncing changes	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No block RLP validation or syncing mechanism is introduced. Human No rationale recorded.
New fork activation mechanism	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM Ordinary activation of the new opcode rule does not add the state or internal-variable modification required by this anchor. Human No rationale recorded.
Engine API changes	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No Engine API field, endpoint, or communication mechanism is introduced. Human No rationale recorded.
Transition-tool interface changes	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No transition-tool field or interface mechanism is required by the proposal. Human No rationale recorded.
New invariant on pre-existing tests	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM The package does not require tests unrelated to EIP-7645 to assert a new block-wide or transaction-wide artifact; the equality is the behavior under test in feature-specific cases. Human No rationale recorded.
New test-framework primitives	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM The described tests require no new expectation type, modifier, helper, or framework-level abstraction. Human No rationale recorded.
Security risks	3	3	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM Taken together, the sealed evidence shows that making ORIGIN equal CALLER in all call frames substantially changes a security-critical identity invariant across multiple call mechanisms and ORIGIN-dependent authorization patterns. Incorrect implementation or incomplete compatibility analysis therefore warrants extensive security review and fuzzing. Human The blast radius is unknown and has to be determined before this can ship. The EIP asserts that for existing misuse affected negatively "a clear example has yet to be identified" — but `require(tx.origin == msg.sender)` is the standard idiom for "the caller is an EOA, not a contract", and aliasing makes it unconditionally true. Every contract using that guard silently loses it, and it fails open: the contract-caller patterns it was written to block (flash-loan and reentrancy shapes) become reachable again. Nobody has measured how many deployed contracts depend on it, in what value, or what each one gates. That is a substantial change to the security assumptions of an unquantified set of live contracts, and it needs on-chain analysis plus extensive review before the change can be judged safe — not a test-suite exercise.
Performance risks	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM The package identifies no new mechanism requiring performance validation or interaction with existing performance behavior. Human No rationale recorded.
Cryptography	0	0	0	Agree	Show rationale LLM No cryptographic primitive or cryptographic behavior is introduced or modified. Human No rationale recorded.

Compare EIP-7645 with other assessments All Hegotá assessments

Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

OP+
Added opcodes
Introduces new opcodes
Score anchors
0
No new opcodes are introduced.
1
A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
2
Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
3
Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
- Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
Modified opcodes
Modifies pre-existing opcodes
Score anchors
0
No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
3
At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
PC+
Added precompiles
Introduces new precompiles
Score anchors
0
No new precompiles are introduced.
1
A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
2
Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
3
Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
- Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
Modified precompiles
Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
Score anchors
0
No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
1
At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
2
Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
3
The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
Added system contracts
Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
Score anchors
0
No new system contracts are introduced.
1
A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
2
Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
3
Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
Modified system contracts
Modifies pre-existing system contracts
Score anchors
0
No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
1
Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
2
Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
3
At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

EVM Gas rule changes
New EVM gas accounting rules
Score anchors
0
No gas accounting changes.
1
Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
2
A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
3
A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
ORD
State-access ordering within opcode execution · Checklist revision 2 only
Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
Score anchors
0
No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
1
A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
2
Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
3
The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
- Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
- Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
- Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
Blob gas accounting changes
New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
Score anchors
0
No blob gas accounting changes.
1
Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
2
A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
3
A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
SGAS
State gas accounting changes · Checklist revision 2 only
New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
Score anchors
0
No state gas accounting changes.
1
An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
2
A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
3
A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
- Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
New EVM gas refund
New gas-refund mechanism
Score anchors
0
No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
1
A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
2
A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
3
A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

New transaction types
Introduces a new transaction type
Score anchors
0
No new transaction types are introduced.
3
A new transaction type is introduced.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
Score anchors
0
No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
1
Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
2
Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
3
Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
New block / header fields
Introduces new block or block header fields
Score anchors
0
No new block or header fields are introduced.
3
A new block or header field is introduced.
ENC
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
Score anchors
0
No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
3
An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
- "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
Block syncing changes
Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
Score anchors
0
No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
1
A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
2
Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
3
Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
ACT
New fork activation mechanism
Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
Score anchors
0
No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
3
Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
- Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

Engine API changes
Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
Score anchors
0
No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
1
A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
2
Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
3
Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
T8N
Transition-tool interface changes
Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
Score anchors
0
No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
1
A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
2
Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
3
Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
- Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
Score anchors
0
No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
1
Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
2
Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
3
Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
INV
New invariant on pre-existing tests · Checklist revision 2 only
Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
Score anchors
0
Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
1
A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
2
A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
3
Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
- Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
New test-framework primitives · Checklist revision 2 only
Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
Score anchors
0
Existing test primitives suffice.
1
Existing primitives need minor extension.
2
New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
3
New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

Security risks
Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
Score anchors
0
No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
1
The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
2
The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
3
The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
Performance risks
Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
Score anchors
0
No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
1
The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
2
The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
3
The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
Edge/boundary conditions
Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
Score anchors
0
No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
1
A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
2
Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
3
Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
Cryptography
Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
Score anchors
0
No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
1
A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
2
Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
3
Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

XEIP
Cross-EIP interactions
Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
Score anchors
0
Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
1
The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
2
The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
3
The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
- +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
- This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
UNSP
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · Checklist revision 2 only
The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
Score anchors
0
The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
1
A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
2
Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
3
A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
- Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.