Retrospective LLM-Based Complexity Evaluations

EIP complexity assessment

EIP-6110: Supply validator deposits on chain

Assessed in Prague / Pectra. The score describes the EIP text available at the assessment cutoff, not the EIP as it stands today.

RetrospectivePrague / PectraAssessment cutoff 2024-01-18Included by cutoffLayers: execution, consensus
LLM Completescore 26
Human Not available· Human complexity assessments were not produced for this fork; only the LLM assessment exists.

LLM assessment

Evaluated on: · Spec revision: 2023-10-12 · 46d979f902

Scope at the cutoff. EIP-6110 (revision 46d979f9, Draft) adds a list of validator deposit operations to the EL block body and a new `deposits_root` header field, the trie root over that list. Starting at FORK_BLOCK, which is selected by timestamp, a block is valid only if its `deposits_root` matches the body list. The body list must also equal the deposits parsed, in transaction order, from logs that the configured DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS emits in the block's receipts. On the CL side, the supporting specs add a `deposit_receipts` field to `ExecutionPayload`/`ExecutionPayloadHeader` (capped at 8,192). They also add a `deposit_receipts_start_index` value that drives the transition away from Eth1Data voting. The EIP adds no gas, opcode, precompile or transaction-type changes.

26HighHigh
Evaluator
LLMChecklist v3
Confidence
Medium
Under-specified at assessment cutoff
Yes — 4 criteria affected
Plausible range
23–29 (High)
Assessment cutoff
2024-01-18 · EIP revision 46d979f902 (2023-10-12)
Score bands · Checklist revision 3
  • Low <12
  • Medium 12–22
  • High ≥23

28 criteria scored 0–3 (4 in exceptional cases; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped); nominal maximum 84.

Complexity profile

Each segment is one criterion's contribution to the LLM total. Hover or focus a segment for its score and rationale.

Top complexity drivers

  1. New block / header fields3
  2. Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)3
  3. Block syncing changes3
  4. Engine API changes2

Under-specified at assessment cutoff: Yes

The EIP text available at the assessment cutoff left material behavior unresolved. The affected criteria and the plausible total range record that uncertainty.

Why: Several details are left open: the Engine API exchange is not specified in the supplied documents; the deposit log parser is a stub; the deposits trie key encoding and the exact header field position are implied, not stated; and handling of malformed logs from the deposit address is not addressed.

Unresolved questions at the cutoff (4)
  • Which Engine API methods or versions carry the deposits list, and is a list exceeding the CL limit of 8,192 rejected by the EL?
  • How should a log from DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS whose data does not decode as a DepositEvent be handled: invalid block, skip, or other?
  • Is the trie key RLP(index) with value rlp_encoded_deposit, matching the transaction and withdrawal tries?
  • Where exactly does deposits_root sit in the header field order relative to the Cancun fields?
Notable ambiguities noted by the assessor (4)
  • The EIP says the deposits list is unbounded, but the CL payload caps deposit_receipts at 8,192.
  • Naming is inconsistent: the EL uses deposits/deposits_root, the CL uses deposit_receipts/deposit_receipts_root.
  • parse_deposit_data is left unimplemented (pass).
  • Logs are filtered only by address, which relies on the deployed contract's code; a custom contract at that address on a test network is undefined territory.

Criterion breakdown

EIP-6110 Prague / Pectra: LLM criterion scores and rationale
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
New block / header fields3Adds a new EL header member (deposits_root) and a new block-level body member (deposits).
  • eip.md · Block structure — "block header MUST be appended with the new deposits_root field" Adds deposits_root to the EL header and a deposits list to the EL block body.
Confidence: High
Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)3Block body, header and Deposit object schemas change, plus the payload schema.
  • eip.md · Deposit — rlp_encoded_deposit A new RLP deposit encoding.
  • eip.md · Block structure Block body RLP gets a deposits list; header gets deposits_root.
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md · ExecutionPayload The SSZ payload gains deposit_receipts.
Confidence: High
Block syncing changes3Multiple rules change. One is complex: the deposits list must match logs produced by executing the block. The others are the RLP structure change and the root check.
  • eip.md · Block structure New body list and header field change block RLP decoding.
  • eip.md · Block validity — conditions 1 and 2 deposits_root must match the body; the body deposits must equal the deposits parsed from execution receipts.
Confidence: High
Engine API changesUnder-specified2One semantic field (the deposit receipts list) is added to the payload exchanged over the Engine API. Adding a payload field conventionally needs new versioned newPayload/getPayload methods, giving one field change plus endpoint-level versioning.
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md · ExecutionPayload — deposit_receipts [New in EIP6110] The payload exchanged with the execution engine gains a deposit_receipts list.
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md · Modified process_execution_payload — verify_and_notify_new_payload The new payload, including deposits, is passed to the EL for verification.
Confidence: Low
Uncertainty: No Engine API spec is supplied. The method versioning and any extra fields (for example, a deposits root in responses) are inferred.
Transition-tool interface changesUnder-specified2Several output or configuration fields are needed: the deposits list, deposits_root, and possibly the deposit contract address. Extracting deposits from logs is internal to the tool and does not change the exchange protocol, so this is multiple fields without a new mechanism.
  • eip.md · Block validity The deposits list is derived from execution receipts, so the state-transition tool must report the deposits it extracted.
  • eip.md · Configuration — DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS The deposit address is a configuration parameter that may need to be supplied to the tool.
  • eip.md · Block structure — deposits_root The deposits trie root is a new derived header value.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: No transition-tool interface document is supplied. The exact fields are inferred from what the EL must compute.
New invariant on pre-existing tests2Every target-fork blockchain test must produce and check the new deposits_root value and the deposits body list. The rubric caps a universal assertion without re-derived pre-fork vectors at level 2, and pre-fork vectors are unaffected.
  • eip.md · Block structure — "block header MUST be appended with the new deposits_root field" Every post-fork block carries deposits_root (the empty-trie root when there are no deposits) and a deposits body list.
Confidence: High
New test-framework primitives2The test suite needs a Deposit representation, a deposits list and root in block construction, a way to generate expected deposits from deposit-contract transactions, and modifiers that tamper with the deposits list or root. These are new construction and expectation abstractions inside the target suite. They do not change how other behavioural families are checked.
  • eip.md · Deposit A new Deposit object with a defined RLP encoding.
  • eip.md · Block validity Expected deposits must be derived from deposit-contract logs, and invalid-block cases need body/header mismatches.
Confidence: Medium
Security risks2The CL's trust in deposits now depends on the EL rejecting blocks whose deposits do not match the executed logs. That changes the EL–CL security boundary and needs targeted adversarial cases: forged, missing, reordered or extra deposits, and logs from reverted transactions.
  • eip.md · Motivation — "Significant increase of deposits security by supplanting proposer voting" Deposit validity moves from CL voting to EL block validation.
  • eip.md · Optimistic sync Online nodes rely on the EL validating supplied deposits against block execution.
Confidence: Medium
Edge/boundary conditionsUnder-specified2There are several independent boundary-sensitive rules: the fork-timestamp switch, list size (zero, one, many, and the CL payload cap), and the uint64 little-endian parsing of amount and index. No combination of dimensions changes outcomes in a way that rises to an elevated matrix.
  • eip.md · Definitions — FORK_BLOCK Activation is by timestamp >= FORK_TIMESTAMP.
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md · Preset — MAX_DEPOSIT_RECEIPTS_PER_PAYLOAD The payload list is capped at 8,192, while the EIP says the EL list is unbounded.
  • eip.md · Block validity — little_endian_to_uint64 amount and index are parsed as little-endian uint64 from fixed-width event fields.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: Whether the 8,192 cap is an EL-tested boundary depends on Engine API handling, which is not specified.
Modified system contracts1The contract's code and rules are unchanged. Its log output convention becomes protocol-interpreted and consensus-binding, which is one indirect output-convention change.
  • eip.md · Rationale — Filtering events only by DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS Relies on the contract emitting only DepositEvent; the contract code itself is unchanged.
  • eip.md · Block validity Logs from the contract become consensus-relevant block-validity inputs.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: One could argue this is level 2, because the EL now relies on assumptions about the contract's code (it emits only DepositEvent).
Patterns affecting pre-existing tests1Behavioural rework is limited to baseline cases that emit logs from DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS. Their expected block bodies or validity change. Ordinary cases only gain the new header field (covered under INV and HDR), not changed inputs or results.
  • eip.md · Block validity — "if log.address == DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS" Every log from the configured address becomes a block-validity input. Baseline scenarios that emit logs from that address (for example, deposit-contract interactions or arbitrary code placed there) now need a matching deposits list.
  • eip.md · Block structure Header and body encodings change, but the framework derives these automatically for ordinary blocks.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: How much rework is needed depends on whether baseline test genesis places code at the deposit contract address.
Performance risks1The EL workload of scanning logs, building the deposits list and computing its trie root is bounded by gas. Component benchmarks of maximum-deposit blocks suffice. The heavier signature-verification cost is on the CL.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations / DoS vectors About 1,271 deposits per 30M-gas block. The EL cost of a byte of deposit data is high, so the EL DoS surface is said not to grow.
  • eip.md · Data complexity About 60MB per year of historical data.
Confidence: Medium
Cross-EIP interactions1Interactions are limited to local compatibility checks: field ordering and encoding after the existing withdrawals body field and the Cancun header fields. EIP-4881 is a CL-only interface and needs no EL coordinated cases.
  • eip.md · Block structure — "Latest block body field before deposits" The deposits field is appended after the existing body fields (for example, withdrawals).
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md · ExecutionPayload Payload extends Deneb fields (withdrawals, data_gas_used, excess_data_gas).
  • supporting/eip-4881.md · Abstract EIP-4881 is a CL snapshot interface; EIP-6110 removes the need for it, with no EL interaction.
Confidence: Medium
Interacting EIPs: EIP-4881
Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensusUnder-specified1Some local details are omitted: the parser, the trie key encoding, and where the field is appended. The surrounding conventions and the canonical contract each point to one intended outcome.
  • eip.md · Block validity — parse_deposit_data ... pass The log-data parser is left as a stub; the decoding is implied by the DepositEvent ABI.
  • eip.md · Block structure — Trie.from([(i, obj) ...]) Trie key/value encoding is not explicit; it is implied by existing indexed-trie conventions.
  • eip.md · Rationale — Filtering events only by DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS Assumes only DepositEvent logs appear; handling of malformed logs is not stated.
Confidence: Medium
Uncertainty: If test networks place other code at the configured address, handling malformed or non-DepositEvent logs has competing outcomes (invalid block vs. skip), which would raise this to 2.
Show 14 zero-score criteria
Zero-score criteria (Checklist revision 3)
CriterionScoreWhy this scoreEvidence / uncertainty
Added opcodes0None.
  • eip.md · Specification No new instructions.
Modified opcodes0No instruction semantics change.
  • eip.md · Block validity Consumes LOG outputs after execution; LOG semantics are unchanged.
Added precompiles0None.
  • eip.md · Specification No precompile is defined.
Modified precompiles0None.
  • eip.md · Specification No precompile changes.
Added system contracts0No new protocol-designated contract is introduced.
  • eip.md · Configuration — DEPOSIT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS References the existing mainnet deposit contract; no new deployment.
EVM Gas rule changes0No execution-gas accounting rule or parameter changes. Deposits come from ordinary contract calls under unchanged gas rules.
  • eip.md · Security Considerations / DoS vectors Discusses existing deposit-contract gas costs only as DoS context; it specifies no change to gas charging.
State-access ordering within opcode execution0Deposit extraction happens after execution, from receipts. No opcode ordering changes.
  • eip.md · Block validity Deposits are taken from receipts after execution; no instruction's access or gas ordering changes.
Blob gas accounting changes0No blob-gas rules change.
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md · ExecutionPayload data_gas_used/excess_data_gas are carried over unchanged; only deposit_receipts is new.
State gas accounting changes0No state-gas accounting is introduced or changed.
  • eip.md · Specification / Execution Layer No state-gas charging is defined.
New EVM gas refund0No new refund mechanism.
  • eip.md · Specification / Execution Layer No refund mechanism is defined.
New transaction types0No new transaction envelope.
  • eip.md · Deposit Deposits are block-body operations, not transactions.
New or modified transaction validity mechanisms0No transaction-validity changes.
  • eip.md · Block validity New rules apply at block level; transaction eligibility and intrinsic gas are unchanged.
New fork activation mechanism0No one-time EL state migration or code installation is required.
  • eip.md · Definitions — FORK_BLOCK Activation is a simple timestamp-based rule switch.
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-fork.md · Upgrading the state The irregular state upgrade is CL-only.
Cryptography0The EL reuses the unchanged MPT/keccak commitment. Signature verification stays on the CL.
  • eip.md · Block structure — compute_trie_root_from_indexed_data Uses the existing trie-root commitment.
  • supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md · New process_deposit_receipt BLS signature checks happen on the CL (apply_deposit), not the EL.
Assessment provenance
Assessed EIP revision
ethereum/EIPs@46d979f902 EIPS/eip-6110.md committed 2023-10-12 · information cutoff 2024-01-18
Current master · File history · blob d4226f1ea4 · sha256 0e5d1899fdef
Rubric
Checklist revision 3 · ethspecs/pm@fe2f793b03
Evaluator
Opus 5.5 (claude-opus-5-5) at high effort, one tool-less call per EIP · isolation bubblewrap_claude_p_no_tools_v1
Source record
Frozen research record research/tasks/10-opus-v3-reassessment/retrospective/outputs/assessments/prague/eip-6110.yaml · sha256 50074ba96289
Supporting documents supplied with the EIP
supporting/eip-4881.md, supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-beacon-chain.md, supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-validator.md, supporting/ethereum-consensus-specs--specs-_features-eip6110-fork.md
Criterion legend and glossary

Every stacked bar, comparison matrix, and criterion table on this site uses the same criterion colours, abbreviations, and order. Colour marks the criterion group; the abbreviation and name identify the criterion. Scores are 0–3 per criterion (4 is exceptional; cross-EIP interactions is uncapped).

EVM surface

Opcodes, precompiles, and system contracts that are added or modified.

  • Added opcodes
    Introduces new opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No new opcodes are introduced.
    1
    A new simple opcode is introduced (no data portion, no complex stack mechanics, and a constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple opcodes are introduced, or a single new complex opcode is introduced (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new opcodes are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (has data portion, or complex stack mechanics, or a dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography opcodes are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" section for a separate assessment.
  • Modified opcodes
    Modifies pre-existing opcodes
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing opcode modifications are introduced.
    3
    At least one pre-existing opcode's behavior is modified (not including gas changes) or a pre-existing opcode is deprecated.
  • Added precompiles
    Introduces new precompiles
    Score anchors
    0
    No new precompiles are introduced.
    1
    A new simple precompile is introduced (constant input length, constant gas cost).
    2
    Multiple new simple precompiles are introduced, or a single new complex precompile is introduced (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    3
    Multiple new precompiles are introduced, and at least one of them is complex (dynamic input length or dynamic gas cost).
    • Cryptography precompiles are not considered complex by default. Refer to the "Cryptography" for a separate assessment.
  • Modified precompiles
    Modifies pre-existing precompiles logic or gas-accounting
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing precompiles are modified.
    1
    At least one pre-existing precompile has its gas schedule modified.
    2
    Multiple pre-existing precompiles have their gas schedule modified, or a single pre-existing precompile has its behavior modified.
    3
    The behavior of multiple pre-existing precompiles, or a single complex pre-existing precompile modified.
  • Added system contracts
    Introduces new system contract, stateful or not
    Score anchors
    0
    No new system contracts are introduced.
    1
    A new system contract is introduced that is not stateful nor does it trigger a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    2
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced or a single new system contract that is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
    3
    Multiple new system contracts are introduced and at least one of them is either stateful or triggers a new system action (e.g. requests to the consensus layer).
  • Modified system contracts
    Modifies pre-existing system contracts
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to pre-existing system contracts are introduced, directly or indirectly.
    1
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has minor indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    2
    Does not directly modify any system contract, but its behavior has major indirect effects on one or more system contracts.
    3
    At least one pre-existing system contract code or state is modified, which would involve irregular state transition or a similarly complex transition methodology.

Gas and accounting

Execution, blob, and state gas rules, refunds, and where charges happen inside opcodes.

  • EVM Gas rule changes
    New EVM gas accounting rules
    Score anchors
    0
    No gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State-access ordering within opcode execution · not in checklist revision 1
    Changes *where inside an opcode's execution* state is accessed, or where gas is charged relative to that access. Because a state access is recorded in the block-level access list only if execution had enough gas to reach it, this ordering is consensus-critical: moving it changes the BAL at every gas boundary of every affected opcode.
    Score anchors
    0
    No change to where state is accessed, or to where gas is charged relative to a state access, within any opcode.
    1
    A single opcode's state-access or gas-charge ordering changes.
    2
    Multiple opcodes' ordering changes, or a new state-accessing operation is introduced whose position in the order must be settled.
    3
    The ordering rule changes for a whole class of state-accessing opcodes at once, or what counts as a recordable state access is redefined — requiring existing BAL vectors to be re-derived across opcodes and forks.
    • Distinct from "Modified opcodes", which asks whether an opcode's **result** changed. This row asks about the **path to the result**, which is observable even when the result is identical. An EIP can be 0 on that row and 3 on this one.
    • Score changes **to** the ordering. Do not score the fact that state accesses are observable — they always are.
    • Each boundary must be re-tested against every other dimension that can change the answer (cold/warm, static/non-static, delegated/direct, revert/success), so the case count grows multiplicatively rather than additively. Note this explicitly under Special Considerations.
  • Blob gas accounting changes
    New Blob gas accounting rules which potentially affect pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No blob gas accounting changes.
    1
    Existing blob gas accounting mechanism is updated.
    2
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced but it does not affect existing mechanisms nor does it affect existing tests.
    3
    A new blob gas accounting mechanism is introduced and affects existing mechanisms which in turn affect existing tests.
  • State gas accounting changes · not in checklist revision 1
    New state gas accounting rules. State gas is the cost of *writing* state, as opposed to accessing or executing it: `StateGasCosts`, `COST_PER_STATE_BYTE`, the block-level state gas budget, and the spill path into execution gas.
    Score anchors
    0
    No state gas accounting changes.
    1
    An existing state gas cost or `STATE_BYTES_PER_*` rate is adjusted.
    2
    A new state-gas-charging site is introduced, or the block-level state gas budget or reservoir allocation is modified.
    3
    A new state gas charging mechanism is introduced, or the spill interaction between state gas and execution gas is modified, affecting existing gas tests.
    • Harder to test than blob gas: the spill path means state gas cannot be metered independently of execution gas, and some costs (e.g. `NEW_ACCOUNT`) are state-dependent.
  • New EVM gas refund
    New gas-refund mechanism
    Score anchors
    0
    No new gas-refund mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new simple gas-refund mechanism is introduced that does not affect either existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    2
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced or a simple mechanism that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.
    3
    A new complex gas-refund mechanism is introduced that affects existing tests or existing gas-refund mechanisms.

Blocks, transactions, and encoding

Transaction types and validity, block and header fields, encodings, syncing, and activation-time changes.

  • New transaction types
    Introduces a new transaction type
    Score anchors
    0
    No new transaction types are introduced.
    3
    A new transaction type is introduced.
  • New or modified transaction validity mechanisms
    Creates new or modifies pre-existing transaction types' validation mechanisms
    Score anchors
    0
    No changes are introduced to the validity rules of existing transaction types or to their intrinsic gas cost calculation.
    1
    Minor adjustments are introduced to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation, but they do not significantly affect existing tests.
    2
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation affect existing tests, but require only limited updates to test cases and no redesign of the testing infrastructure.
    3
    Changes to validity rules or intrinsic gas cost calculation require extensive rework or redesign of the tests or testing infrastructure.
  • New block / header fields
    Introduces new block or block header fields
    Score anchors
    0
    No new block or header fields are introduced.
    3
    A new block or header field is introduced.
  • Encoding changes (RLP/SSZ)
    Introduces encoding changes at the transaction/block/interfaces level
    Score anchors
    0
    No encoding changes are introduced at the transaction, block, or interfaces levels.
    3
    An encoding change is introduced at transaction, block or interfaces level (e.g. RLP -> SSZ).
    • "Interfaces level" includes the Engine API. Score an Engine API encoding change (e.g. JSON -> SSZ) here.
  • Block syncing changes
    Modifies block RLP validation mechanisms that require test client syncing.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    1
    A single simple RLP validation mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple simple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced or a single complex one.
    3
    Multiple RLP validation mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is deemed complex.
  • New fork activation mechanism
    Modifies state, internal variables, or similar, at the fork activation block
    Score anchors
    0
    No state modifications, internal variables or similar are modified at the fork activation block.
    3
    Either a state modification or internal variables are modified at the fork activation block.
    • Initialization of new internal variable is not considered a modification.

Client interfaces

Engine API and transition-tool interface changes.

  • Engine API changes
    Introduces new fields to the Engine API directives
    Score anchors
    0
    No new fields or communication mechanisms are introduced to the Engine API.
    1
    A single new field is introduced in one of the Engine API endpoints.
    2
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points, or a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
    3
    Multiple fields are introduced to one or multiple Engine API end points and a new Engine API end-point is introduced.
  • Engine API encoding changes · Checklist revision 1 only
    Engine API encoding changes (the revision-1 template defines no anchor text for this row).
  • Transition-tool interface changes
    Modifies or adds new fields to the transition tool interface.
    Score anchors
    0
    No modifications to the transition tool interface are required.
    1
    A single new field needs to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    2
    Multiple new fields or a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    3
    Multiple new fields and a new mechanism has to be introduced to the transition tool interface.
    • Special consideration must be paid to this section if the EIP introduces a mechanism that requires the state transition tool to be aware whether the block it is processing is the fork-activation block.

Testing impact

Rework, new invariants, and new primitives required in the test framework.

  • Patterns affecting pre-existing tests
    Implements a new validation mechanism or rule that translates in reworking pre-existing tests
    Score anchors
    0
    No pre-existing tests are affected by this change.
    1
    Minor subset of existing tests are affected by this change.
    2
    Considerable subset of existing tests are affected by this change but involves only a contrived category of tests.
    3
    Major subset of existing tests are affected, including diverse category of tests (benchmarks, static, multiple forks, etc.).
  • New invariant on pre-existing tests · not in checklist revision 1
    Tests that are **not about this EIP** must nonetheless assert something this EIP produces. Their logic does not change; they gain a new thing to check.
    Score anchors
    0
    Pre-existing tests assert nothing new.
    1
    A narrow, contrived category of pre-existing tests gains a new assertion.
    2
    A broad category gains a new assertion, applied mechanically.
    3
    Every test in the fork gains the assertion regardless of what it tests, and pre-fork vectors must be re-derived to satisfy it.
    • Paired with the row above, and easy to confuse with it. "Patterns affecting pre-existing tests" asks whether existing tests must be **reworked**; this row asks whether they must **additionally assert something new**. Score both — an EIP can be low on one and high on the other.
  • New test-framework primitives · not in checklist revision 1
    Requires new abstractions in the test framework itself — expectation types, modifiers, helpers — beyond writing test functions with what already exists.
    Score anchors
    0
    Existing test primitives suffice.
    1
    Existing primitives need minor extension.
    2
    New expectation or modifier primitives are required, reusable within this EIP's own test suite.
    3
    New framework-level primitives are required that become a permanent part of the framework and are used by other EIPs' tests.

Risk and validation

Security, performance, boundary conditions, and cryptography that need validation.

  • Security risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that could compromise the security of the chain, users, validators, or other stakeholders, if not implemented properly.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that could pose a security risk.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms are self-contained, can be validated in isolation, and do not alter existing invariants that could pose a security risk for any stakeholders.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms interact with a limited number of existing components, slightly altering their security assumptions and requiring a targeted security review or fuzzing.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms interact with multiple existing components, including critical ones, substantially altering their security assumptions and requiring an extensive security review and fuzzing.
  • Performance risks
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms and requires performance validation.
    Score anchors
    0
    No new mechanisms are introduced that require performance validation.
    1
    The introduced mechanisms can be benchmarked in isolation and do not affect existing performance behavior.
    2
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be fully benchmarked in isolation, but they only have a limited impact on the existing performance benchmarks.
    3
    The introduced mechanisms cannot be benchmarked in isolation and have a substantial impact on existing performance benchmarks or have complex interactions with existing mechanisms.
  • Edge/boundary conditions
    Feature contains edge/boundary conditions.
    Score anchors
    0
    No discernible edge cases or boundary conditions are introduced.
    1
    A single edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanism is introduced.
    2
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced, but none of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
    3
    Multiple edge-case or boundary-condition prone mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them requires an elevated number of cases to test.
  • Cryptography
    Introduces new cryptography mechanisms or modifies existing functionality that involves cryptography
    Score anchors
    0
    No cryptography mechanisms are introduced.
    1
    A new cryptography mechanism is introduced but it is a well known mechanism that is known to have vast resources to aid on its testing.
    2
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced that are well-known or a single but novel mechanism is introduced that is either untested or has limited resources.
    3
    Multiple new cryptography mechanisms are introduced and at least one of them is a novel mechanism.

Coordination

Cross-EIP interactions and behavior that clients must agree on before tests exist.

  • Cross-EIP interactions
    Introduces or modifies mechanisms that affect other EIPs in either the same or past forks.
    Score anchors
    0
    Fully self-contained EIP that does not depend on, modify, or conflict with any other EIP.
    1
    The EIP interacts with one or more other EIPs in a non-critical and limited way but can be tested independently for the most part.
    2
    The EIP depends on or modifies one or more other EIPs such that coordinated testing and consideration is required, but interactions are limited in scope and not complex.
    3
    The EIP has strong interdependencies with multiple EIPs, requiring extensive coordinated cross-EIP testing as well as potential re-design of existing test vectors.
    • +1 for every 3 additional interacting EIPs beyond the first 3, each of which requires its own coordinated test cases. List the EIPs in the rationale.
    • This row is intentionally uncapped, unlike every other anchor: each interacting EIP is another axis of the test matrix, so a ceiling would make a 12-EIP product indistinguishable from a 3-EIP one.
  • Unspecified behavior requiring cross-client consensus · not in checklist revision 1
    The EIP text does not determine the answer for cases a test can construct. Clients must agree on a previously unspecified detail before tests can be baselined. The cost here is coordination and re-baselining, not test writing.
    Score anchors
    0
    The EIP text determines the answer for every case a test could construct.
    1
    A few details are unspecified but have an obvious intended reading.
    2
    Details require client agreement before tests can be written, but they are localized.
    3
    A previously unspecified *and previously unobservable* behavior becomes consensus-critical; expect tests to be re-baselined on each round of EIP amendment.
    • Score this from the EIP's state at assessment time: whether it has client implementations, whether it has been through a devnet, and how many open questions remain on its discussion thread.